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In this thesis, I firstly present my view on how to define the anti-immigrant party family in 
Western Europe. I argue for a broad grouping including parties sharing resentment towards 
immigration and multiculturalism as central contents of their politics even though they have 
different origins and partially different ideologies. To assert that anti-immigrant parties are right-
wing authoritarian and ethnonationalist is not always accurate; instead parties use frames that 
work in specific country contexts. 
 
Secondly, I analyse the anti-immigrant frames used by Sverigedemokraterna and claim that it is 
possible to see a diffusion of the liberal frames used by the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn. SD is 
increasingly claiming to stand up for e.g. secularism, freedom of speech, gender equality and 
LGBT rights against perceived threats from immigrant groups in general and Muslims in 
particular. These themes, almost exclusively related to immigrants, are combined with themes like 
costs and perceived criminality of immigrants. 
 
This diffusion of liberal frames to the national conservative SD can be at least partially 
understood by the fact that Sweden and the Netherlands are both liberal countries. It can be seen 
as confirmation of the argument that anti-immigrant parties with different ideologies can be 
grouped as a family. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 2010, there is a general election in Sweden. It is already clear that this election will 
be historical in some way. There are now two blocs, two government alternatives, standing 
against each other long before the election day. If the sitting right-wing coalition wins, it will be 
the first time in modern Swedish history a right-wing government has remained in power after a 
full term. If the left-wing coalition wins, the Swedish left and green parties will for the first time 
have ministers in office. But, a third possible historical occurrence is complicating this picture. 
Many opinion polls have shown that the anti-immigrant party Sverigedemokraterna (SD) may reach 
the electoral threshold and enter national parliament for the first time. None of the other parties 
seem to want to have anything to with the newcomers, which – if SD succeeds – may complicate 
the possibilities of forming a government. Sverigedemokraterna has its roots in neo-fascism and 
even though it has gone through great changes since it was founded, it is still not generally 
regarded as a politically acceptable party. It remains to be seen if Sverigedemokraterna succeeds in its 
effort to gain enough votes to make a serious breakthrough in 2010, but it is clear that even 
though SD might still be stigmatised in the eyes of the establishment, it is no more the marginal 
extremist movement that it was only about a decade ago. 
 
For many Swedes, a breakthrough of SD would be something quite shocking. In an international 
perspective however, the fact that Sweden does not have an openly anti-immigrant party in 
parliament is what could be regarded as surprising. In many Western European countries, 
including Sweden’s three neighbouring countries, anti-immigrant parties are established electoral 
forces, and in some cases they have also been part of or at least supported governments.  
 
1.1 Outline of the study 
 
1.1.1. A two part study 
It should be pointed out from the beginning that this is a two part study. The focus on the thesis 
is on the second part, which is an empirical text analytical study of the anti-immigrant frames1 
used by Sverigedemokraterna. My interest is, however, to also discuss anti-immigrant politics as a 
Western European phenomenon, and I argue that in order to understand Sverigedemokraterna it is 
                                                 
1 I introduce the concept ”frame” in chapter 4.1. Suffice it to say now that I use the word ”frame” to denote a way of 
conceptualising a political issue or political struggle. 
2 
relevant to connect the party to other parties and trends within what I have called the anti-
immigrant party family in Western Europe. Since the discussion of this party family is lively, and 
researchers disagree over how to label and understand them, it is important to position oneself 
here. Therefore I also, in part one, conduct an analysis of the party group based on a literary 
review of some major contributions to the understanding of the party family, focusing on the 
development in the 21st century. This is then used also as a springboard for part two. 
 
1.1.2. Research problem  
The last few decades have seen a wave of new anti-immigrant political parties often conceived as 
being radical right wing reaching electoral success throughout Western Europe. This party group 
can be seen as heterogenic in that the parties have different origins and in part different 
ideologies, but at least have one thing in common, namely that they nowadays pursue politics 
which is directed against immigration and multiculturalism.2 
 
Parties of this anti-immigrant party group are often assumed to be right-wing in an authoritarian 
and anti-liberal way, occupying one end of a socio-cultural conflict dimension where the other is 
liberal and progressive. This has been due to a focus on things like national identity, law and 
order and traditional values. There has however been a trend in recent years that immigrant 
scepticism is increasingly framed within a liberal discourse, and anti-immigrant parties have been 
stressing issues normally associated with the liberal end of the socio-cultural conflict dimension. 
Such issues include for example gender equality, freedom of speech and individualism. 
Immigrants and immigrant cultures have then been represented as more collectivist, conservative, 
patriarchal and intolerant, and therefore accused of being a threat to Western democracy. This 
has been a successful strategy for some parties, with the more famous examples being Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, and Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) in Norway.3 
 
Firstly, this evolution amplifies the heterogeneity of the party group that is often seen as radical 
right, which calls for an updated understanding of the party family of anti-immigrant parties. 
Secondly, successful political frames travel – a fact that has been seen earlier in relation to anti-
immigrant parties.4 The question is to what extent we are able to find proof of a cross-national 
diffusion of such liberal anti-immigrant frames. The parties mentioned as examples above have 
                                                 
2 Fennema 2005. It should be stated that ”multiculturalism” is used in a very general way in this thesis. Not as a 
specific policy regime, but rather as the opposite of perceived national homogeneity. 
3 Akkerman & Hagelund 2007 
4 Rydgren 2005b 
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more liberal roots than most of the other anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe. It could 
therefore be suggested that this trend is mostly to be found in liberally rooted parties, but this 
should not be taken for granted without empirical study. 
 
Sweden is an interesting case to study. On one hand it might be wise for an anti-immigrant party 
to tone down the ethno-national and authoritarian aspects of their rhetoric and stress civic and 
progressive dimensions, more compatible with the Swedish context.5 On the other hand 
Sverigedemokraterna, the leading but still small anti-immigrant party in Sweden, is one of the parties 
connected to this party family with a neo-fascist background, which could restrain its possibilities 
of adapting liberal frames. 
 
1.1.3. Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to contribute to the understanding of the group cohesion of anti-
immigrant parties in Western Europe, and to the evolution and cross-national diffusion of 
political ideology and rhetoric within the group of anti-immigrant parties. 
 
The purpose is also to explore and better understand the content and evolution of the frames 
that Sverigedemokraterna uses to criticise immigration and multiculturalism. 
 
1.1.4. Key questions to be addressed 
Part one 
- How can the political parties in Western Europe who resent immigrants and multiculturalism be 
defined as a group? 
Part two 
- What general anti-immigrant frames is Sverigedemokraterna using? 
- To what extent is Sverigedemokraterna using liberal anti-immigrant frames? 
- Are there signs of changes over time?  
- If so, how can we understand these changes? 
 
1.1.5. Disposition 
The thesis starts with a background chapter which summarises the evolution of the anti-
immigrant party group in Western Europe and Sweden, together with some reasons behind these 
                                                 
5 Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:58 
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parties’ relative success – or, in the case of Sweden, non-success. Following that, I very briefly 
give an account of some previous research about the party family in general and 
Sverigedemokraterna in particular. After this, I present some theoretical concepts – frames, diffusion 
and translation – that I will use later in my study 
 
The analytical section of this thesis follows then in two parts. The first part consists of a 
discussion and analysis of the anti-immigrant party family in Europe based on a literary review. 
Here I go into more detail into previous research and present my view on how this party family 
should be defined. The second part departs from the discussion in the first, and is an empirical 
case study of the main Swedish anti-immigrant party, Sverigedemokraterna, the anti-immigrant 
frames it uses and how these have changed over the last nine years. An introductory note in part 
two is an elaboration of the methodological considerations needed to carry out my empirical 
study. 
 
In the last chapter I first integrate the two parts, by looking again at the general phenomenon of 
anti-immigrant parties in light of my empirical study and draw some general conclusions. Second, 
I present a brief discussion which touches on related issues and aims to point out a few ways 
ahead. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance 
There is a relevance dimension to all research. That a study can be done does not automatically 
mean that it should be done. Here it is of uttermost importance to be aware of, and position 
oneself in relation to previous research so as to contribute with something.6 One can also discuss 
relevance in terms of intra- and extra-academical relevance. Intra-academical relevance has to do 
with the research community, if it contributes and adds to, instead of just repeating, previous 
research. It is also positive if social science research has some extra-academical relevance; that it 
is of significance for the society in general.7 The understanding of the relevance of my study will 
hopefully grow throughout the text, as I go through previous research, but let me shortly present 
why I find it relevant: 
 
Concerning the intra-academical relevance: The ideational features of anti-immigrant parties are 
of course written about, but as Mudde points out in his study of the ideology of the party family, 
                                                 
6 Esaiasson et al. 2007:19; Marshall & Rossman 2006:11 
7 Marshall & Rossman 2006:33-36 
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not very much – and not so much from an international perspective.8 The evolution of anti-
immigrant politics in the direction of more liberal framing of immigrant critique is seldom 
thematised in connection with the understanding of the anti-immigrant party family. While 
interest in Sverigedemokraterna is considerable in Swedish society, there is little written about the 
party and its ideological content academically. An empirical in-depth study of how the party 
frames its anti-immigrant politics is thus motivated, especially out of the new perspective of anti-
immigrant politics as a defence of liberal values. 
 
The extra-academical relevance is motivated by the fact that these parties are often seen as a 
challenge to today’s Western democracy, because of the exclusionary and xenophobic dimensions 
of their politics.9 I mentioned that interest in SD is great in Sweden, and the party is very much 
seen as a threat to the existing political order in the country; all other parties publicly distance 
themselves from it. The ideational evolution of the parties may only be one reason to understand 
its emergence, but still very much worth studying, not least because of the fact that it is election 
year in Sweden. 
 
1.1.7. Limitations 
The geographical limitation is Western Europe. This is mainly because it is a very common 
classification. There are of course related parties with xenophobic content in Eastern Europe and 
the rest of the world, but the immigration history and the kind of anti-establishment and anti-
immigrant politics pursued  in the Western European countries make it reasonable to treat the 
parties from this area as a family. I also wanted to avoid the common mistake of claiming to treat 
Europe but only include Western European examples.10 
 
The focus of my study is not on explaining why these parties exist or why they have been 
successful or not. A study like this can maybe contribute to such an understanding, but I do not 
ask these questions myself here. There are many theories about the emergence and success and I 
have included a summary in the following background chapter. 
 
I do not assess whether the frames that I present are reasonable or the claims that I analyse are 
true or false, it is also not a normative study about multiculturalism. My interest is rather on the 
discursive level of the anti-immigrant parties in general and Sverigedemokraterna in particular. 
                                                 
8 Mudde 2000:18-19 
9 See for example Betz 2004; Betz 2005. 
10 See for example Schain et al. 2002; Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. History of the anti-immigrant party family in Western Europe 
The historical narrative of the new movement of anti-immigrant parties typically starts in France. 
The French Front National (FN), under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen was the first of the 
populist right parties to have great success in national elections in Western Europe. Founded in 
1972, FN lacked electoral success in its first decade, but after a few promising achievements in 
local elections it had a major breakthrough in the national election of 1984, reaching about 11% 
of the votes. The greatest success of Le Pen, still leader of the party, is the sensational result in 
the presidential election of 2002, when he beat the left wing candidate Lionel Jospin and reached 
the second round where he was facing – and losing to – Jacques Chirac.11 Another famous case is 
Austria, where the Jörg Haider-led Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) won 27% of the votes in the 
election of 1999 and entered the national government in the beginning of the following year, 
resulting in the rest of the governments of the EU refusing to cooperate with the Austrian 
government.12 In Belgium, we have the example of Vlaams Blok, which the Court of Cassation 
found to be violating a law against racism in 2004.13 Vlaams Blok then changed its name to Vlaams 
Belang, dropped some of the more controversial content of its program and has continued to be a 
part of the Flemish political landscape. In Scandinavia Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and 
Fremskrittspartiet in Norway have been successful. In the Netherlands, there have been a couple of 
parties known for their charismatic leaders in the 21st century, namely Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), 
which got its name from its leader, who was murdered shortly before the election in 2002, and 
more recently, Partij voor de Vrijheid, whose leader Geert Wilders has been prosecuted for 
incitement to racial hatred and discrimination. In Italy, different parties of the right more or less 
rooted in fascism have been strong political forces, for example one of the parties merging to 
become what is today the governing party PdL, Alleanza Nazionale, was followers to the post-
fascist party MSI.14 
 
Without going into detail in each country and party, I present here a table which aims at giving a 
cursory overview of parties normally associated with the anti-immigrant wave across Western 
                                                 
11 For an elaboration of the Front National case with explanations of their success, see Rydgren 2004. 
12 Riedlsperger 2004 
13 Erk 2005. Vlaams Blok = Flemish Bloc, Vlaams Belang = Flemish Interest. 
14 See Widfeldt 2004; Betz 2004; Pettersson 2009 for general summaries of the evolution of the phenomenon. 
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Europe. The table is not exhaustive, and parties included are those who have been significant in 
the 21st Century. 
 
Table 1. Anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe. 15 
Country Party Best election result (year) 
Austria FPÖ 26,9% (1999) 
 BZÖ 10,7% (2008) 
Belgium Front National 2% (2003 & 2007) 
 Vlaams Belang16 12% (2007) 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti 13,8% (2007) 
Finland Perussuomalaiset/Sannfinländarna 4,1% (2007) 
France Front National 15% (1997) 
 Mouvement pour la France 1,2% (2007) 
Greece Laïkós Orthódoxos Synagermós 5,6% (2009) 
Germany NPD 1,6% (2005)17 
 DVU 1,2% (1998) 
Italy Alleanza Nazionale18 15,7% (1996) 
 Lega Nord 10,1 (1996) 
Netherlands Lijst Pim Fortuyn 17% (2002) 
 Partij Voor de Vrijheid 5,9% (2006) 
Norway Fremskrittspartiet 22,9% (2009) 
Sweden Sverigedemokraterna 2,9% (2006) 
Switzerland Schweizerische Volkspartei 28,9% (2007) 
United Kingdom British National Party 1,9% (2010) 
 
2.2. Sweden and Sverigedemokraterna: an introduction 
In the early 1990s, Sweden had a party that was sometimes connected to the new radical right 
movement in Europe called Ny demokrati.19 It was similar to its Scandinavian counterparts in that 
it was a liberal anti-tax populist party who could be said to have picked up its anti-immigrant 
rhetoric along the way. The party had quick success, entering the Swedish parliament in 1991 – 
the same year that it was founded – with 6,7% of the votes and 25 mandates. The demise of Ny 
                                                 
15 Table 1 is an updated version of a similar table in Widfeldt 2004. Some parties whose significance has diminished 
have been left out, but some newer parties have been added. Pettersson 2009 has also been of help determining the 
situation five years after Widfeldt. For newer election results I have used the respective sites of the parties on the 
English version of Wikipedia, and the website http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de. (URLs in bibliography). 
16 The predecessors Vlaams Blok gathered 11,6% as its best result in 2003. 
17 It should be pointed out though, that in 1969 NPD reached 4,3% of the vote. 
18 Dissolved in 2009, when it merged with Silvio Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia into the new party PdL. 
19 ”New Democracy” is the English translation of the party name. Kitschelt includes it in his classical study rather 
hesitantly. Kitschelt 1995:121. 
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demokrati was also quick, in 1994 it failed to defend its seats in the parliament and in 2000 it was 
dissolved.20 
 
At the time of Ny demokrati’s success, Sverigedemokraterna was a peripheral and fairly new party 
with strong connections to anti-democratical Nazi and fascist groups.21 It was founded in 1988 as 
a successor of Sverigepartiet, which in turn was a fusion of two groups: Framstegspartiet and Bevara 
Sverige Svenskt.22 In the second half of the 1990s SD worked hard on becoming respectable and 
disassociating itself from open racism and fascism. In 1996 a prohibition of uniforms was 
introduced and three years later the party officially disassociated itself with Nazism. Controversial 
issues like the death penalty and a total prohibition of abortion has also been taken away from the 
party programme. Another notable change made to fit into the Swedish mainstream is the 
changing of the party symbol from the Swedish flag as a burning torch to a hepatica.23 The 
current party leader since 2005 is Jimmie Åkesson, born in 1979, who speeded up the 
modernisation process of the party, and who has been described as having a “smart appearance, 
[…] low-key but confident and reasoned style and [a] ‘clean’ background”.24 
 
The French Front National was very influential for the party, even though it has later very much 
seen the Danish Dansk Folkeparti as a source of inspiration.25 SD calls itself a centre party, and 
even though economical issues are toned down, it likes to associate itself with the Swedish social 
democratic tradition and the idea of Folkhemmet.26 At the same time it is value oriented and see its 
roots also in national conservatism; the most central issues circle around national identity and 
opposition to immigration.27 I will go more into detail on some ideological issues in my analysis, 
but suffice it to say right now that Sverigedemokraterna has generally been regarded as a 
conservative right-authoritarian party.28 It tends to be most popular among young men without 
higher education.29 
 
                                                 
20 Rydgren 2005a:ch.3 
21 Rydgren 2005a:118, this brief history of the party is based on Rydgren 2005a:ch.5; Widfeldt 2008; Mattsson 2009. 
22 The names in English respectively: ”The Sweden Party”, “The Progress Party” and “Keep Sweden Swedish”, the 
latter is a slogan that was also used by SD for a long time. 
23 Five of seven of the Swedish political parties in the parliament have a flower as symbol. The torch was a direct 
translation of the former symbol of the British National Front, and similar to the symbol of French Front National 
and the Italian fascist party MSI. The change was made as late as 2006. 
24 Widfeldt 2008:271 
25 Rydgren 2005a:118 
26 Folkhemmet, in English ”the people’s home” was a concept of the Swedish social democracy denoting community 
and togetherness of the whole of the Swedish society. See Berman 2006:163-167. 
27 Sverigedemokraterna 2005a 
28 Rydgren 2005a:124 
29 Holmberg 2007 
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Compared to many other anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, Sverigedemokraterna is still a 
small party. Only in the 2000s has it started to gain some influence in politics. Still, it has never 
been part of the national parliament. Between the elections of 2002 and 2006 it doubled its share 
of voters from 1,44% to 2,93% but this result was still a good per cent away from the Swedish 
election threshold of 4%. However, many opinion polls have shown that SD may be above the 
threshold in the upcoming election in 2010. Its best result in the opinion polls from the leading 
Swedish opinion institute SIFO is 5,8%, which it reached in November 2009.30 Even though SD 
failed to enter the national parliament in 2006, the election year could still be seen as a success as 
it gathered significant support in many municipalities. Its best result was in the southern Swedish 
town of Landskrona, where 22,26% of the electorate supported SD. All in all, it won seats in 
about half of the 290 Swedish municipalities. 
 
Table 2. Election results of Sverigedemokraterna in the 21st century.31 
Year Swedish Parliament European Parliament  Church Assembly 
2001   0,8% 
2002 1,4%   
2004  1,1%  
2005   1,7% 
2006 2,9%   
2009  3,3% 2,9% 
 
2.3. Explanations of the emergence in Western Europe 
There has been a great deal of theorising about why the anti-immigrant parties have emerged, and 
have been successful (or not) in elections. Normally the explanations are divided into two groups, 
one consisting of demand-side factors, and one of supply-side factors. The former departs from 
macrostructural societal processes, while the latter focuses on the parties themselves and on 
political opportunity structures. I will try to briefly summarise the most common explanations.32 
 
First, some demand side factors: Different types of transformations of the Western European 
societies, that is, the loss of power of structures like class and religion or the restructuring of the 
labour market because of globalisation, may have led to feelings of insecurity among voters who 
have then turned to ethnic nationalism. The “single issue thesis” points to increased immigration 
                                                 
30 SIFO 2009 
31 Table 2 is based on Mattsson 2009:35, and completed with the latest results from the article about 
Sverigedemokraterna on the Swedish version of Wikipedia. 
32 Eatwell 2003 and Rydgren 2007 both do more in depth summaries of the research on how to explain the 
emergence and my summary is based on them. 
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as such to be the explanation, which can be related to xenophobia and “ethnic competition”. 
Political discontent can also be seen as a reason, then it is claimed that voting for anti-immigrant 
parties is mainly a vote against the establishment, and not so much a positive vote on the best 
perceived contender. 
 
Second, some supply side factors: Here political opportunity structures (POS) is often 
thematised. POS refers to a broad set of resources or factors that are external to a party or 
movement, but help to shape the success of it, opening up spaces for new parties. The 
convergence of existing parties on the political left-right scale, and realignment processes tied or 
not tied to that convergence, are two such structures. If media and the existing political parties 
are acknowledging new parties and treat them as equal or refusing them to participate is another. 
The electoral system of a country is a third; high electoral thresholds and majority voting systems 
make it harder for new parties to establish themselves. The national tradition is another factor. 
Various national traditions or cultures can enable or disenable a party to enter the mainstream.33 
Party organisation and leadership is another supply side factor. How well a party is organised and 
how solid a base the party has is important, and the significance of a charismatic leader is also 
sometimes stressed. Then of course the message of the parties is of uttermost importance for 
their success. How do parties manage to attract voters? The ideology and discourse, the content 
of the parties’ programmes and the framing of their message play a vital role here. My aim with 
this thesis is not to explain the emergence of the parties, but this last dimension is closest to the 
content of my study. 
 
2.4. Explanations of the non-emergence in Sweden 
As we have seen, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway both have successful anti-
immigrant parties. That no such party has established itself permanently in Sweden can be 
explained in different ways.34 On one hand, the Swedish people are not devoid of xenophobic 
and anti-immigrant attitudes, and there is also scepticism against the political establishment, 
typical undercurrents for parties with a populist strategy to exploit. Party identification is also less 
strong than before. On the other hand, the convergence in the political space has not been as 
significant in Sweden as in other countries, and the socio-economic conflict dimension has been 
of greater importance than elsewhere, two reasons as to why it has been harder for new parties to 
establish themselves. There has also been no party strong enough to mobilise voters since Ny 
                                                 
33 The Nazi past in Germany, and the effort to disengage the country from its racist past could be one such example, 
explaining why no anti-immigrant party has established itself in the federal politics. 
34 I mainly use Rydgrens argumentation from 2005 in this paragraph. See Rydgren 2005a:131-134. 
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Demokrati and the extra-parlamentarian and extremist roots of Sverigedemokraterna means that it is 
not perceived as a decent alternative in the eyes of many voters. The relatively low degree of 
politicisation of the immigration issue by the established parties may also explain the non-
emergence of a successful anti-immigrant party in Sweden35 
                                                 
35 Dahlström & Esaiasson 2009 
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3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
3.1. The anti-immigrant party family 
Since part one of my study is a literary review and analysis I will go more into detail on previous 
research there, referring, highlighting and discussing some of the more important contributions. 
Research that addresses anti-immigrant parties as an international (or Western European) party 
group are very often monographs with case studies about specific parties and/or countries, with a 
more general introduction and/or conclusion.36 Jens Rydgren, apart from being the editor of a 
couple of these monographs, has written about this as an international phenomenon, for example 
about cross-national diffusion of successful concepts, and a more general assessment of the party 
family and the research about it.37 Cas Mudde has written about the ideology of the party family, 
focusing on five parties from three countries.38 Hans-Georg Betz is another notable scholar who 
has tried to take a wider grip of the family.39 Herbert Kitschelts study from 1995 entitled The 
Radical Right in Western Europe is a classic in the field and the study from which I depart in part 
one of my analysis. The rise of liberal values in anti-immigrant politics has mainly been written 
about by two authors, who I also will use extensively later, namely Tjitske Akkerman and 
Anniken Hagelund.40 
 
3.2. Sverigedemokraterna 
There has been a remarkable productivity of journalists writing about Sverigedemokraterna during 
recent years, during which time many books have been released. Mainly these books have been 
broad reviews about the party, including history, ideology, important persons and current political 
activities, building on different empirical materials.41 There is less written about Sverigedemokraterna 
academically so far. Jens Rydgren has written broadly about right-wing populism in Sweden, and 
then included Sverigedemokraterna, its ideological content and the Swedish political opportunity 
structures allowing (or not) for its success.42 Anders Widfeldt has written about the history of 
                                                 
36 Rydgren 2005c; Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004; Merkl & Weinberg 2003; Schain et al. 2002 
37 Rydgren 2005b; Rydgren 2007 
38 Mudde 2000. His rather narrow sample is the reason as to why his study is not very central in part one of my 
paper. 
39 Betz 2005; Betz 2004; Betz & Johnson 2004 
40 Akkerman 2005; Hagelund 2005; Akkerman & Hagelund 2007, cf. Betz &Meret 2009 about this in connection 
with Islam. 
41 A few examples: Mattsson 2009; Orrenius 2010, collected coverages from the daily newspaper Sydsvenska dagbladet; 
Bengtsson 2009, a monograph written by journalists and political scientists focused on how to ”take the debate” with 
Sverigedemokraterna. 
42 Rydgren 2005a 
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Sverigedemokraterna with a focus on the necessity of organisational and ideological change on the 
road from an extremist background to the mainstream politics.43 Holmberg have written about 
SD and the Swedish voters, showing who votes for the party and that SD is by far the least 
popular party if the whole electorate is allowed to utter its meaning.44 
                                                 
43 Widfeldt 2008 
44 Holmberg 2007 
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4. THEORETICAL TOOLS: FRAMES, DIFFUSION AND TRANSLATION 
 
4.1. Frames 
Jens Rydgren uses the term ”master frame” when discussing the international spreading – or 
cross-national diffusion – of the successful concept of Front National.45 Rydgren has adopted the 
idea of frames from the social movement researchers Snow and Benford, who see frames as 
interpretative schemata which help to structure, simplify and condense the world, and to render it 
meaningful.46 To attract adherents a movement must use frames that are attractive to individuals 
in a given society. A political party in Western Europe after the Second World War will find it 
tough – to say the least – to reach the mainstream with openly anti-democratic values and 
biological racism, which was the earlier framework of xenophobic and radical right wing political 
movements. The new master frame of Front National consisted instead of the related but 
democratically more compatible combination of anti-establishment populism and 
ethnopluralism.47 
 
A master frame is a broader discursive structure where a movement or a political party could be 
understood to fit in. I will use the word frames in a more general way, to denote a way of 
conceptualising a political issue or a political struggle. Snow and Benford also talk about frames 
as the “sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns”48 of 
social movements, or in my case, political parties. One could understand a frame to be 
somewhere in between the concepts of discourse and rhetoric,  the former being an ontologically 
existing entity which governs how individuals can understand and behave in the world, leaving 
little space for agency, and the latter more a way to convince an audience. 
 
I will talk about liberal anti-immigrant frames in this thesis, as a way of connecting a defence of 
certain liberal values to opposition of immigration and multiculturalism. When talking about 
liberal and conservative the first association is to ideology. I use the term frames, and framing, 
because it offers a more dynamic way of looking at the relation between organisations and 
followers, parties and voters, than would be the case for ideology. Firstly because frames can 
include other things than pure ideological content, one example is that Rydgren talks about 
                                                 
45 Rydgren 2005b. The concept of frames in regards to anti-immigrant parties is used by other researchers as well, see 
for example Hagelund 2005:163; Betz & Meret 2009:313; Widfeldt 2008:272-273. 
46 Benford & Snow 2000:614; Rydgren 2005b:426 
47 Rydgren 2005b, I come back to this in part one of the study (chapter 5). 
48 Benford & Snow 2000:614 
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populism as an important ingredient of the Front National master frame, which could be 
considered as a political form or style, rather than an ideological feature.49 Another example can 
be that fear, for example, can be of importance in the framing of anti-immigrant political parties, 
without being an ideological component. Secondly, because my goal is not first and foremost to 
define whether the content of a political party’s proposed politics is widely and coherently 
accepted as being “liberal”. The actual goal may or may not be regarded as liberal; it is more a 
question of how an issue is interpreted and parcelled. And a liberal framing is possible even when 
a political movement or party is not considered having a liberal origin in such a way that it is 
possible to talk about this party having a coherent liberal ideology. 
 
There are always “frame alignment processes” going on in the interaction between a movement 
and its supporters, to better fit contextual transformations or new political aspirations.50 The 
individual can of course adapt to the rhetoric and values of an organisation, but there are also 
constant activities on the part of the organisation in order to be synched with and attract 
potential followers. This also goes for political parties and voters. There are different frame 
alignment processes, such as frame bridging (outreach of an organisation to connect certain 
grievances or experienced problems to their cause), frame amplification (the stress on certain 
beliefs and values) or frame transformations (changing old understandings and meanings).51 
 
4.2. Diffusion and translation 
Diffusion can be seen as a flow of practices or ideas among actors within a larger system or a 
term encompassing contagion and mimicry, or adoption of ideas which have proved themselves 
successful in one context.52 Snow and Benford have also connected their concept of frames to 
how organisations and political struggles “cluster temporally in a cyclical fashion”.53 That is, 
certain grievances and certain possible political issues can be represented in different ways in 
different temporal and spatial contexts, but often there is congruence, stemming from a diffusion 
of the frames of one successful movement in the “cycle” to others. This exact thought is what 
Rydgren builds on when he analyses the “master frame” of Front National.54 Successful frames in 
one country can travel to other countries where there are conditions for a similar evolution. For a 
                                                 
49 Mudde 2000:13 
50 Snow et al. 1986 
51 Snow et al. 1986:467-476; Benford & Snow 2000:624f. 
52 Strang & Meyer 1993:487; Rydgren 2005b:429-430 
53 Snow and Benford 1992:133 
54 Rydgren 2005b:429-430. Rydgren discusses possible ways of how diffusion takes place and for example he points 
out that the Internet has facilitated diffusion processes very much, but it is not what is important, and not really part 
of his study, and neither of mine. 
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frame to be successful in a new context it needs to strike a responsive chord – there has to be 
cultural linkages between contexts. Firstly, this means that there need to be empirical credibility of 
the problem designation also in the new context; the representation of problems must be 
understandable and reasonable. Secondly, a narrative fidelity is needed, that is, the amplified values, 
beliefs and so forth must be relevant in the new context as well, and the rhetoric used must be 
understood.55 
 
A responsive chord does not mean, however, that everything has to be identical, there are certain 
“translations” going on. All frames are shaped in accordance with the political culture and the 
cultural climate of the new context.56 Or, in the words of Rydgren:  
 
it should be emphasized that diffused ideas and practices are always being actively modified 
or even ‘translated’ to a greater or lesser extent by adopters in order to fit the unique political 
and cultural context in which they are embedded.57  
 
Rydgren takes as an example here that even though Front National was influential in Scandinavia, 
one of its most important issues, abortion, which they ardently opposed, is toned down in secular 
protestant Scandinavia.  
 
                                                 
55 Snow and Benford 1992:138-141; Rydgren 2005b:430; Strang & Meyer 1993:490-492 
56 Snow and Benford 1992:148-149 
57 Rydgren 2005b:431 
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5. PART ONE: THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY FAMILY 
 
When talking about the political parties that I have chosen to call anti-immigrant parties, one 
comes across the interesting paradox that the literature and the researchers on this phenomena 
more or less agree on which parties to include in the research, but that there is no widespread 
consensus on neither the core definition of nor the ideological characteristics connecting the 
parties included.58 Or, as Merkl put it in the introduction to one monograph he edited, 
“experienced analysts still disagree on categorization, labels and boundaries between its different 
manifestations.”59 And while this thesis may not be the suitable context to settle the disputes, I 
find it relevant to position myself in the debate, criticising and pointing out a few things and 
discuss the grouping on the basis of recent development. The question I posed in the 
introduction is rather broadly formulated, so as to enable a fairly wide discussion: 
 
- How can the political parties in Western Europe who resent immigrants and multiculturalism be 
defined as a group? 
 
5.1. A party family or not? 
The group of parties associated with anti-immigrant politics in Western Europe is far from 
monolithic. In table 1 I presented the most important of the parties usually included in the anti-
immigrant party family. One thing that we have to elaborate on is the fact that they are mostly 
treated as a group, by me and by others, and – as we will see later – most of them clearly draw 
inspiration from one another, does not mean that they are all one and the same. Some of the 
parties have a neo-fascist heritage in one way or the other, even though this is often toned down 
due to the stigmatisation this can cause. This is the case for, among others, the French Front 
National, the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the British National Party, Sverigedemokraterna, and the now 
defunct Italian Alleanza Nazionale. Fremskrittspartiet in Norway and its Danish namesake, out of 
which the present Dansk Folkeparti grew, were both founded as socio-economically liberal anti-tax 
populist parties in the 1970s. For both parties, immigration and nationalism were not important 
issues at first, and caught on in importance only in the 1980s. The Austrian FPÖ and BZÖ have 
their roots in national liberalism, and the third Lager of Austrian politics.60 In the neighbouring 
Alp country of Switzerland, SVP is another old party having been transformed from more 
                                                 
58 Rydgren 2007:242 
59 Merkl 2003a:4 
60 The other two Lagers are the socialist and the catholic-conservative; see Riedlsperger 2004. 
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liberal-conservative roots.61 As we will see the Lijst Pim Fortuyn was based on the very liberal 
world view of its leader Pim Fortuyn, and the present Dutch Partij vor de vrijheid has grown out of 
liberal roots, with a leader, Geert Wilders, who was earlier an MP for another liberal-conservative 
party, VVD. 
 
My reason to group these parties is at a first glance very pragmatic. It is because I build on earlier 
research and follow the paths of experts in the field. The parties I discuss here are generally 
mentioned in the contemporary research as examples of the anti-immigrant party group. 
Secondly, and more importantly, I also argue that there is a minimal commonality among the 
parties, which is that they are all anti-immigrant, by which I mean that they are adversely disposed 
to immigration and multiculturalism in some way, promoting exclusion and some kind of 
homogeneity within the nation state. There has been reluctance by some researchers to call the 
party group “anti-immigration”, because of the treatment of the ‘foreigner question’ has been too 
complex,62 and that the immigration issue is far from the only reason for voters to turn to the 
parties.63 Still, even though some may hesitate to call the immigration issue their raison d’être,64 the 
anti-immigrant stance is, when looking at earlier research (and mass media) without doubt their 
present sine qua non for being associated with one another.65 Exclusionism is central, and 
immigrants are the out-group which is being excluded.66 
 
This is also one of the reasons67 why I have chosen the label “anti-immigrant” parties rather than 
one of all the other on the smorgasbord of party family names out there.68 I go with the earlier 
researchers which have used “anti-immigrant”,69 rather than the ones choosing “anti-
immigration”,70 because “immigrant” can signify both a person who moves in to a country and a 
person who already lives there and may be a citizen, but still perceived as an outsider due to the 
belonging to “another culture” (second- and third-generation immigrants are also nominally if 
                                                 
61 In the 1990s, SVP were not included in the party family at all, but a turn to more immigrant sceptic politics under 
the leadership of Cristoph Blocher qualifies them according to many observers. See for example Widfeldt 2004. In 
recent years they have attracted international attention as xenophobic with their election poster of white sheep 
kicking out a black sheep, and by being the largest Swiss party pushing for the minaret ban in 2009. 
62 Betz & Johnson 2004:318 
63 Mudde 1999. 
64 Mudde 1999:182 
65 Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:51; Fennema 2005:1 
66 Betz 2004 
67 The other being that I find the label “right” problematic, see below in chapter 5.5. 
68 Some examples out of my bibliography: Extreme right (Mudde 1999;2000; Eatwell 2000;2003; Ignazi 2002), 
Extreme right wing populist (Rydgren 2005b), Nativist (Betz & Meret 2009), New right radical parties (Minkenberg 
1997), Populist right (Widfeldt 2008), Radical populist right (Betz & Johnson 2004), Radical right (Rydgren 2007), 
Radical right-wing populist (Betz 2005), Right-wing populist (Hagelund 2005) 
69 van der Brug et al. 2000; Fennema 2005; Dahlström & Esaiasson 2009 
70 Akkerman 2005; Akkerman & Hagelund 2007 
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not logically immigrants). “Anti-immigrant” thus captures both the immigration and the national 
homogeneity issue.71 
 
5.2. Some theoretical considerations of the party family 
One of the more famous and influential studies of the new anti-immigrant populism is Herbert 
Kitschelt’s The Radical Right in Western Europe from 1995. Kitschelt claims that the political space 
in which parties compete in Western Europe must be two-dimensionally understood. That means 
that there is not only an economical dichotomy between left (redistributive/socialist) and right 
(free-market/capitalist), there is also a cultural dichotomy spanning between libertarian and 
authoritarian positions. (see figure 1). I will call these two dimensions the socio-economical and the 
socio-cultural conflict dimensions.72 
 
Figure 1. The political conflict dimensions in Western Europe73 
 
 
 
The main political cleavage in advanced industrial capitalist Europe is, according to Kitschelt, the 
cleavage between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian politics. On one extreme, there is a position 
embracing economically left and politically and culturally libertarian values, on the other there is a 
position which stands for economically right and politically and culturally authoritarian values. 
                                                 
71 And I do not agree with Mudde, who rejects similar labels on the ground that ”immigration issue” is not the only 
ideational content or reason to vote for the parties, see Mudde 1999:182-183. He may be right, the parties may for 
example address other issues as well, but I still find the label useful when looking at the parties as an international 
group, it is then what combines them that is interesting. 
72 Kitschelt, 1995:ch.1 
73 This is a simplified version of a model of the political space that Kitschelt uses in his study. Kitschelt 1995:15 
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The competition between parties is thus neither purely horizontal, nor vertical, but diagonal from 
the left upper corner to the right lower corner in his model (see figure 1). The horizontal, 
traditional left-right cleavage is a question of socialism versus capitalism, where, very roughly, 
expansion of the welfare state stands against free market competition. The vertical socio-cultural 
conflict dimension includes more value and identity oriented issues, such as gender equality and 
family values, multiculturalism and individualism.74 
 
Kitschelt has an idea of something which he calls the “master case” of the European radical right. 
He argues that the cleavage between left-libertarian and right-authoritan is historically contingent, 
but holds for modern industrial capitalist Europe. 75 Because of that, what he calls the radical 
right has to position itself as right-authoritarian, combining neo-liberal appeals with focus on 
anti-immigrant and other authoritarian positions in order to be successful.76 
 
Kitschelt has attracted criticism from other scholars. Not least because of his focus on the 
necessity of an economically rightist position. Cas Mudde writes that this focus is peculiar for two 
reasons, firstly because of the fact that for anti-immigrant parties, economy is at best a secondary 
issue, and secondly because of the fact that most anti-immigrant parties have developed a welfare 
chauvinist economic programme, meaning that they are generally positive towards welfare state 
provisions, but want to limit those to the “own people”.77 Rydgren points out that one error of 
Kitschelt was that he based his analysis on the attitude of the voters and not on the parties’ actual 
political program. In addition to that he remarks that the attacks on the “big state” by many anti-
immigrant parties have been more populist than neo-liberal.78 Kitschelt’s model could be 
criticised because of these reasons, and also in other ways. But still, it is interesting to bear it in 
mind, because it is an often-referred to and is an important contribution to the field, but also as it 
can help as a tool in a discussion, shedding light on political-ideological conflict lines in Western 
democracies. 
                                                 
74 Kitschelt 1995:20. It should be stated here that I in this thesis more or less use ”libertarian”, which is the word 
Kitschelt uses and ”liberal” values as signifying the same thing, a permissive and progressive view of society in 
contrast with a authoritarian and traditional. 
75 Kitschelt, 1995:19. It must also be pointed out to Kitschelt’s defence that he does not mean that all anti-immigrant 
parties have to be right-authoritarian, only that this is the “master case”, the recipe for success. See Kitschelt 1995:89. 
76 Success is of course also dependent on other things. One such thing is the convergence of the other parties, which 
could be explained with the help of figure 1. Firstly, there is a populist dimension to this. If the main parties are 
cooperating, moving towards the middle and can be seen as being very much alike, a contender party could gain 
votes on its positing itself as the only real alternative. Secondly, if the polemic on the left-right scale is low there is an 
increased importance of immigration matters and other socio-cultural themes vis-à-vis socio-economic themes. Or, to 
frame it spatially: When the horizontal dimension loses its importance, the vertical wins. Kitschelt 1995:25, 124ff., cf. 
Rydgren 2007:253f.; Eatwell 2003:58; Rydgren 2005b:421. 
77 Mudde, 1999:189 
78 Rydgren 2007:245; Eatwell 2000:422 
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Jens Rydgren has proposed a narrower definition of the commonalities of what he calls the 
radical right, avoiding socio-economical aspects. He argues that the emergence of these parties is 
to be explained by a new right wing “master frame”, which has undergone a process of cross-
national diffusion.79 This master frame combines ethnonationalist xenophobia with anti-
establishment populism, evolved in the French Front National and spread throughout Europe 
after the party’s electoral breakthrough in 1984. 
 
The new radical right-wing parties share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in myths 
about the distant past. Their program is directed toward strengthening the nation by making 
it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values. They generally view 
individual rights as secondary to the goals of the nation. They also tend to be populists in 
accusing elites of putting internationalism ahead of the nation and of putting their own 
narrow self-interests and various special interests ahead of the interest of the people. Hence, 
the new radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and 
antiestablishment populism.80 
 
But even though we have seen that Rydgren criticises Kitschelt, he still finds that the correct label 
for the parties are “right” and that this is because of the fact that there is an authoritarian 
dimension common to them, and he states that: “The new radical right is right-wing primarily in 
the socio-cultural sense of the term.”81 In this way, it is not only asserted that the anti-immigrant 
parties by default subscribe to authoritarian values, but also that authoritarian values are to be 
labelled “right”, which is a very common feature. 
 
5.3. Ethnonationalism and the immigration issue 
Of course, one could differentiate between nationalism and immigrant scepticism, but 
nevertheless, those dimensions are tightly interwoven and important parts of the ideology of the 
anti-immigrant parties.82 
 
The ethnonationalist xenophobia dimension in Rydgrens “master frame” is based on the doctrine 
of ethnopluralism, elaborated through the French intellectual movement Nouvelle Droite, and often 
associated with terms like “new racism” or “cultural racism”.83 Ethnopluralists do not perceive 
humanity as consisting of hierarchically ordered biological “races”, but believe that there are 
                                                 
79 Rydgren 2005b 
80 Rydgren 2007:242, cf. Ignazi 2002:25, 35 
81 Rydgren 2007:243 
82 Mudde 2000:169-173 
83 Rydgren 2005b:427; Minkenberg 1997:72 
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distinctly disparate ethnic groups, that are equal but still ontologically different from one another. 
The different ethnic groups, often conceived of as nations, should have a right to independence 
and to govern themselves. However, different nations should not be mixed but live separated 
from each other. According to this perspective, mixing different ethnicities leads to social tension 
and criminality and in the long term to cultural extinction. This world view also allows for 
xenophobes and nationalists to stress the importance of cultural homogeneity and put its “own 
people first” and at the same time denounce racism. 
 
Even though not everyone thematises the political-philosophical idea of ethnopluralism, there is a 
widespread agreement among authors commentating on anti-immigrant parties that the ethnical 
issue is central to the party family. Hans-Georg Betz states that the anti-immigrant parties have 
an “ethnocratic” ideal, and elaborates that: “The notion that some groups cannot become 
members of the community because of their ethnic origins or cultural background is central to an 
ethnocratic conception of society.”84 
 
I earlier introduced the anti-immigrant stance as the sine qua non of the parties of the anti-
immigrant party group. Less immigration, especially from non-Western European countries, and 
tougher demands on the inhabitants with an immigrant background to assimilate and adapt to the 
national homogeneity is seen to be crucial to the well-being of the nation state. There are 
different reasons to be critical against immigration and multiculturalism that are often repeated by 
these parties, mainly four recurring themes.85 First, they are seen to be a threat to the (ethno-) 
national identity of the nation state. Second, immigrants are perceived as a major cause of 
criminality and other forms of social instability. Third, immigrants are thought of as causing 
unemployment, “taking the jobs” from the native population. Fourth, they are seen to be preying 
on the welfare system of Western democracies, increasing the cost for welfare states. In 
connection to the discussion on the “single-issue thesis” for the success of anti-immigrant 
parties, Eatwell stresses that the themes of law and order, unemployment and welfare are often 
thematised, connecting problems in these areas to immigrants.86 Or, in other words immigrants 
are framed to be, not only threat to the national identity, but also to be causes of criminality, less 
labour security and loss of welfare. 
 
                                                 
84 Betz 2005:36, cf. Betz & Johnson 2004:320ff. 
85 Rydgren 2007:244 
86 Eatwell 2003:49 
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All of these reasons to be critical against immigration and multiculturalism fit in with the idea of 
the anti-immigrant parties being authoritarian. To these reasons however, is another dimension is 
increasingly added, namely that immigrants constitute a threat to the liberal values of Western 
democracies. 
 
5.4. Immigrants as a threat to liberal values 
Even though Kitschelt’s model has been influential, we have seen critique of it on economical 
grounds – that his assertion of the socio-economical position of the new anti-immigrant parties is 
skewed. On the socio-cultural conflict dimension it is almost always asserted that anti-immigrant 
parties are among the most conservative and authoritarian. This is not false, but increasingly the 
“threat” from immigration is seen to be a threat to modern liberal and democratic values, which 
would be more associated with the other end of the socio-cultural spectrum. 
 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn was the most flagrant example of how one anti-immigrant party sticks out from 
the crowd in this regard. It is also a very special case in many ways. LPF was founded just a few 
months before the national election in 2002 by Pim Fortuyn, a former sociology professor, who 
was dismissed as a candidate by the party Leefbaar Nederland after a controversial statement about 
Islam. The charismatic Fortuyn very quickly achieved widespread support, but was murdered just 
nine days before the election. Still, LPF attracted 17% of the votes, ending up as the second 
largest party in parliament, and joined a coalition government.87 The coalition government fell 
after less than a year, and fall did also LPF, who decided to dismiss itself in 2008. 
 
Even though some aspects of the party’s politics could be regarded as authoritarian, such as 
tougher crime fighting as an important issue, LPF was no typical right-authoritarian party. Pim 
Fortuyn himself was an outspoken liberal, and the party put “no emphasis on traditional 
morality”.88 Pim Fortuyn instead framed immigration, and above all “Islamization” as a threat to 
the liberal values of the Western world, and of the Netherlands in particular. Some of those 
values that were stressed and seen as being under attack from the assumingly more conservative 
immigrants were freedom of expression, individual autonomy, secularism and the emancipation 
of women and homosexuals.89 
 
                                                 
87 See Lucardie & Voerman 2003 for a description of the course of events in 2002. 
88 Pennings & Keman 2003:62 
89 Akkerman 2005:341, 346; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:49; Lucardie & Voerman 2003:3 
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Not even in the narrow definition of what constitutes the anti-immigrant parties proposed by 
Rydgren is it clear that the Lijst Pim Fortuyn was one. That is because it has been argued that LPF 
was not even ethno-nationalist.90 On the one hand, it used a fierce anti-immigration rhetoric and 
the failure of multiculturalism as one important theme. Pim Fortuyn, who called himself a “liberal 
patriot”, wanted to close the borders for new immigrants and stressed how important it was for 
immigrants to learn Dutch and thoroughly adjust to the Dutch society. But on the other hand 
there were few references to any glorious past of the Dutch nation, and Pim Fortuyn argued that 
fully integrated immigrants were as Dutch as autochthons. This has led commentators to call the 
nationalism of LPF civic nationalism, which means that the framing of the threat from 
immigrants was not one based on the ethnic composition of the Dutch people or nation, but on 
the civic virtues of Dutch society. 
 
But even though LPF does not easily fit in with the predominant definitions of what constitutes 
the anti-immigrant party family it is very often included in the research. Rydgren and van 
Holsteyn argue that LPF was to be treated as a “functional equivalent”. The party may have 
lacked ethno-nationalism and authoritarian views on society, but it drew on xenophobia and anti-
establishment populist rhetoric, and voters turned to the party for mainly the same reasons as 
voters in other countries who voted for anti-immigrant parties, the party filled the same “electoral 
need”.91 
 
Not only in the Netherlands are these liberal anti-immigrant frames important features of politics. 
The Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet frames immigration scepticism in a similar way to that of Pim 
Fortuyn, “defending liberal values – human rights, liberty, individualism and gender equality – 
against immigrant cultures represented as collectivist, authoritarian, patriarchal and honour-
bound”.92 The culture of immigrants has been problematised by Frp, partly in line with the 
general normal anti-immigrant frames (i.e. that immigrant cultures are to blame for crime), but 
also in other ways. The theme of the supposed lack of women’s rights in immigrant cultures has 
been recurring, and advocated as a reason to tighten immigration and force assimilation into 
Norwegian society.93 
 
                                                 
90 Pennings & Keman 2003:62; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:41; Akkerman 2005 
91 Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:41 
92 Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:214 
93 Hagelund 2005:155-163 
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The liberal framing of immigrant adverseness is very much connected to an increasing 
politicisation of Islam in Europe.94 In recent years, Islam and European Muslims have been the 
focus of heated debates throughout Western Europe. The passed referendum on a minaret ban in 
Switzerland in 2009 and the predicted95 ban on burkas and niqabs in Belgium and France are two 
examples of policy outcomes in one way or another directed against Muslims. Even where there 
has been no such political outcomes, there has been widespread debates about mosques, 
headscarves, religious schools, the role of women among Muslims, and the ever present issue of 
“Muslim terrorism” after September 11th. These debates are in no way limited to outspoken anti-
immigrant parties, but they have picked up the issue and are now using it throughout Western 
Europe. Partly, this is done with references to centuries-old Christian traditions, but even more 
often this has been a useful tool for anti-immigrant parties to “put themselves forward as 
defenders of fundamental liberal values, such as individualism, secularism and gender equality.”96 
Islam is then often represented as a monolithic and unchangeable undemocratic, oppressive and 
backward religion (often even as an ideology), by its very nature incompatible with the European 
democracy. The threat of “Islamization” seems to be a very potent frame for anti-immigrant 
parties to use, and not least this was the case for Pim Fortuyn. I already mentioned the centrality 
of this idea in his rhetoric, and this frame suits his more civic version of nationalism very well, 
since there is no need to evoke ethnic arguments to oppose immigrants when “Islamization” is 
the represented problem.  
 
That Lijst Pim Fortuyn could be seen as an outsider, or an incomplete version of a classic “radical 
right” party,97 may even have been a strong reason for its success. Rydgren and van Holsteyn 
write that: “In order to mobilize anti-immigration sentiments, the immigration issue would first 
have to be detached from ethno-nationalism, framed in other terms, and then be put high on the 
political agenda – which is exactly what Pim Fortuyn did.”98 
 
5.5. Conclusions of part one 
What the flash party Lijst Pim Fortuyn has taught us, is firstly, that for an anti-immigrant party to 
be successful it does not have to frame its political quest in an ethno-nationalist way. Those ideas 
may even be contra-productive in an increasingly globalised Western Europe, where the concept 
                                                 
94 Betz & Meret 2009 
95 As of 2010-05-16 these bans were not yet finally decided on. 
96 Betz & Meret 2009:313 
97 Betz for example writes that the Netherlands ”never experienced the emergence of a genuinely populist radical 
right” in an article which includes a broad sample of parties. Betz 2004:2 
98 Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:42 
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of the “ethnically homogenous” nation is in decline. The second lesson to be learned is that it 
does not have to be that anti-immigrant parties by necessity embrace a classical authoritarian view 
of society, focusing on the collective and on traditional values. This has been an important part 
of the discussion about anti-immigrant parties, and the reason to why the party group so often is 
rewarded with labels including the word “right” even though they are not right in the socio-
economical sense of the word.99 Instead, permissive liberal issues such as individual freedom and 
gender equality can be powerful tools for building an anti-immigrant framework. 
 
I am not stating that anti-immigrant parties are in a process of becoming full-fledged libertarians, 
or that it has been totally wrong to call the group authoritarian. The point is rather that the socio-
cultural conflict dimension needs to be put into question when it comes to conceiving this party 
family, because of the fact that an anti-immigrant political party does not have to coherently 
embrace all values on one end of the spectrum. It is perfectly possible to be radically permissive 
in regards to the equality of sexual minorities and women and very strict concerning immigration. 
 
This means that Rydgren’s “master frame” needs to be rethought. While anti-establishment 
rhetoric may always be a potent frame for parties which are seen as threatening mainstream 
political life, ethno-nationalism is not needed to build a case against immigrants. The label “right” 
for the party group might not be convincing either. First, because right is mainly associated with 
the socio-economical conflict dimension and here the parties have different positions and are not 
at all gathered at the right end of the spectrum. Second, because of the above-mentioned 
questioning of the socio-cultural conflict dimension in connection with anti-immigrant parties as 
a family; even though one would want to label authoritarian positions as “right” independent of 
the socio-economical dimension, an anti-immigrant party does not have to coherently embrace 
these. It creates unnecessary confusion when there are articles written where the nostalgic and 
ethnocratic ideology of the “radical populist right” is stressed, but LPF, who did not subscribe to 
these ideational features, is included.100 Another example of this is that even though Rydgren 
hesitates as to whether LPF and Fremskrittspartiet should be included in the party family he still 
includes them in his research about it.101 Or, a third: Ignazi writes about “references to fascism” 
and stresses the centrality of the ethnic community and anti-liberal ideology of what he calls the 
extreme right, and then he mentions in a footnote the puzzle that the Scandinavian parties – 
which he has included in his article – do not easily fit into the family.102 
                                                 
99 Rydgren 2007:242-243; Ignazi 2002:35; Betz & Johnson 2004; Betz 2005 
100 Betz & Johnson 2004 
101 Rydgren 2008:738; Rydgren 2005c; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005 
102 Ignazi 2002:25, 35, 37 
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Conclusively, I argue for a broad understanding of an anti-immigrant family of parties opposing 
immigration and multiculturalism, instead advocating stricter immigration policies and a 
homogenous nationalism of some sort, be it civic or ethnic. This is because of the centrality of 
these above-mentioned issues of the parties normally associated with the group. It is also because 
of the fact that voters seem to have turned to LPF, often put on the margins in the anti-
immigrant party family, for mainly the same reasons as they turned to anti-immigrant parties in 
other countries. Instead of hesitating to if some parties which are clearly anti-immigrant should 
be included as “really” being part of the family, it is better to include them, and then if needed 
illuminate the heterogeneity of origins and ideology of the parties. It might for example be 
reasonable to divide the party group in sub-groups, as some researchers also do.103 
 
For the case of anti-immigrant politics, the question seems to be one of finding frames that 
works, frames that combine empirical credibility with narrative fidelity – a credible problem 
designation and rhetoric based on suitable values and beliefs – and this is largely determined by 
the national context and tradition, together with the origins of the party. This is why LPF 
surfaced and had such success in the Netherlands, a country known for liberalism and tolerance. 
 
 
                                                 
103 See for example Fennema 2005 
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6. PART TWO: SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA 
 
The analysis of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn on the part of Rydgren and van Holsteyn ends with the 
conclusion that LPF showed that one may mobilise anti-immigrant sentiments in other ways than 
within an authoritarian and ethno-nationalist framing, and the phrase: “It remains to be seen if 
this will influence actors elsewhere, and start new processes of cross-national diffusion.”104 This is 
exactly what I am interested in doing in this thesis. I have chosen to study if one can see any 
evolution of liberal frames used by Sverigedemokraterna. On the one hand it is a conservative party 
with a neo-fascist background, on the other hand, a too conservative message may not be 
attractive to potential voters in Sweden. The questions I posed in the introduction were: 
 
- What general anti-immigrant frames is Sverigedemokraterna using? 
- To what extent is Sverigedemokraterna using liberal anti-immigrant frames? 
- Are there signs of changes over time?  
- If so, how can we understand these changes? 
 
6.1. Methodological Considerations 
 
6.1.1. Qualitative text analysis 
Benford and Snow write about how frames are constructed in the relation between a social 
movement and its adherents, or in this case a political party and its voters. There needs to be “a 
shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of 
change”.105 The problem of representation, how a societal problem is identified and framed, is 
thus central to any political organisation and text analysis is a common way of studying political 
ideas.106 Textual sources like ideational documents, party programmes and debate articles express 
the problem representations of a political movement or party.  
 
That the analysis is qualitative means that it is a question of interpretation on the behalf of the 
researcher. This is because of the fact that the importance does not lie in the exact numbers of a 
theme or word in a text, but in the meaning which can be drawn from it based on the cumulative 
                                                 
104 Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:58 
105 Benford & Snow 2000:615 
106 Bergström & Boréus 2005; Esaisson et al. 2007:ch.12 
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and contextual understanding of the researcher. Recurring themes can of course be of 
importance, but single events can also be very significant. In this empirical study, I have drawn 
inspiration from what Söderfeldt has called “genetic idea analysis”, which he defines thusly: 
 
Genetic analysis of ideas and arguments means trying to prove to what extent found 
elements of thought are in accordance with that what earlier thinkers or current of ideas 
have pronounced.107 
 
The interpretation that I do in my analysis of the material has to be founded in previous research; 
it has to have a “cumulative affiliation”, which in my case is elaborated on in connection with my 
scheme of analysis.108 Then the contextual understanding of the material is also important. This 
contextual understanding is based on the prejudice of the researcher,109 the background to the 
study and references to other relevant research.110 That the idea analysis is “genetic”, which 
means focused on searching for the relation between ideas, fits well with my idea of a possible 
diffusion among anti-immigrant parties. 
 
The actual process has been one of reading and re-reading the material. On first readings, I have 
tried to get a more general grip of the ideational content. On second readings, I have used my 
scheme of analysis, highlighting in the texts and making notes along the way. This has left me 
with a processed material out of which the text in my analysis here below has been formulated. 
The analysis is presented in two steps. In the first part, following my first research question, I 
have focused on the framing of immigration and immigrants as a “problem” in general, following 
common frames evoked when criticising immigrants presented in the background chapter. Here, 
I have looked broadly at the anti-immigrant dimension of the political content of 
Sverigedemokraterna. In the second part, I have gone into more detail into the more novel reason to 
be adversely disposed to immigrants: That they are a threat to the liberal values of Western 
democracy. This is the main interest of the thesis and articulated in research question number 
two.  
 
I have included a dimension of change in my research question. I include change under respective 
headline. Change has occurred when I find something in a later material that was not there 
earlier, or the other way around, when some aspects have disappeared or are very much toned 
                                                 
107 Söderfeldt 1972:126 
108 See below, chapter 6.1.5. 
109 In the positive, Gadamerian understanding of the word prejudice, as previous knowledge, not as illegitimate bias. 
Swedish: förförståelse. 
110 Söderfeldt 1972:127-129 
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down. The clearest change of course is to be noted when comparing corresponding material – 
which themes and formulations appeared or disappeared in the update of the party program? But 
it is also of importance when a new idea or frame turns up, even though I have no equivalent 
earlier material. This is also related to my material. SD was not allowed to publish debate articles 
in the main Swedish newspapers in 2001, therefore I cannot compare a debate article from 2009 
in that way, but I can still discuss its relation to the other material. 
 
6.1.2. Material 
The selection of what material to use in idea analysis is important, but something that each 
researcher has to decide on and motivate in relation to his or her own study.111 I am interested in 
how the anti-immigrant politics of Sverigedemokraterna is presented publicly. My concept of frames 
is that they are something connecting the party and the potential voter, and therefore officially 
presented material is interesting. A few different sources have thus been of interest. Firstly, I have 
used material from the party where it describes its ideology and political principles, which is 
common when studying the ideational content of political parties: The party and principle 
programs, 112 election manifestos from the Swedish parliamentary elections of 2002, 2006, and the 
political guidelines for the election of 2010,113 together with manifestos of the church assembly 
elections. Different “idea documents” describing the party’s position on specific political issues 
are also included.114 I have also studied information on the homepage of the party.115 Secondly, I 
have used sources that are published in or directed to mass media.116 Debate articles by leading 
SD politicians are one source here. I restricted the media content to articles written by SD 
politicians themselves, and included no articles written about the party, so as to avoid possible 
interpretations or biases on part of journalists. The other source is press releases from the party. 
Those press releases are directed to the public (even though not all of them reach it), and give a 
                                                 
111 Bergström & Boréus 2005:36-37; Esaiasson et al. 2007:248-249 
112 The party program from 2002 is an updated version of the one from 1999, with a few small changes, of which I 
have noted one in my analysis. The principle program from 2005 is an updated version of the one that was written in 
2003, but the only change in it is that an endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was included. 
See Sverigedemokraterna 1999; 2002a; 2003; 2005a. 
113 Even though there was no adoption of an official election manifesto when this was written (May 2010), the party 
presented some ”political guidelines that Sverigedemokraterna work for and run on.” These guidelines clearly build on 
the earlier election manifestoes. See http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010. 
114 The party programs of 1999 and 2002 were long documents including positions on many issues. The principle 
program of 2003 is a much shorter document, and after the adoption of this, SD has instead adopted these different 
idea documents. 
115 http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se. 
116 The importance of mass media for anti-immigrant parties is increasingly stressed in research on the phenomenon. 
See for example Koopmans & Muis 2009. 
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good overview of the political activities of the party and of the frames it uses in relation to certain 
political events and issues. 
 
Three sources that I considered but excluded were: web logs of SD politicians, since they are of a 
more personal and a more ephemeral nature; the party newspaper SD-kuriren since this is more 
intern than the sources communicated to the broader public;117 and televisionised debates, since I 
thought it better to limit the material to purely textual sources.118 Had I included the two former 
sources, it would have meant that my already compehensive material would have been huge, 
which would have posed more questions in regards to validity. 
 
The material has been gathered in a combination of ways, through the party homepage and 
through contact with party representatives and through browsing in media archives. I have also 
thoroughly considered the bibliographies of other people writing about SD as a kind of “double 
check”. 
 
There is an obvious and inevitable bias in the material, given the fact that I have been interested 
in the period from 2001 up until today, and that is that the material has evolved as 
Sverigedemokraterna as a party has evolved. At the start of the new millennium, SD was a more 
peripheral and extremist party. Consequently, it had a smaller organisation producing lesser 
material directed to the public and were not given time in media, especially not as a real 
contender. However I still consider that the media appearances (that I lack from the earlier years) 
are of interest and, as I mentioned earlier, it can be analysed in relation to my other material. 
 
6.1.3. Temporal scope 
The time span of my material is from 2001 up until 2010.119 This is because of the fact that a 
logical starting point would be before the breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn in Dutch politics. This 
does not mean however, that I compare SD in a point A-point B way, before and after Fortuyn. 
The material would not allow for that because there is not an exactly corresponding material in 
                                                 
117 This is not to say that the party paper is secret in any way. On http://www.sd-kuriren.se one can follow the paper 
and download earlier issues. (A parenthesis is that after browsing the issues of the actual period my impression is that 
mainly the same frames are used, only sometimes put more bluntly, and in some cases extreme.) 
118 SD is in no way as represented in television as other parties, but Jimmie Åkesson has had the opportunity to 
debate against party leaders on three occasions: Against Lars Leijonborg of the liberal Folkpartiet in 2004, against 
Mona Sahlin of the social democrats in 2007 and against Maud Olofsson of the centrist Centerpartiet in 2009. 
119 The party program written in 1999 has been included. This is because it was valid until it was updated in 2002, 
and thus relevant to assess change during my time period. 
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2001 and 2010. A possible change will also have taken place over time, as a process more than as 
a switch. 
 
6.1.4. Validity, reliability and intersubjectivity 
The question of validity – are we measuring what we claim that we measure? – is omnipresent in 
empirical social sciences.120 Validity is nothing that one clears in a couple of paragraphs, but is a 
vital part of all empirical studies. Still, I wanted this heading to point out a few things. The 
argumentation in connection to my scheme of analysis is important here. As I already have 
pointed out, working cumulatively is important, because it means that I rely on more experienced 
researchers. This does not, however, take away my own responsibility, and the indicators of what 
I see as reasonable to discuss as liberal frames are ultimately a result of my own processing of 
previous research; this is why there is a fairly long argumentative discussion in connection with 
the presentation of my scheme of analysis.121 Validity is also a question of theoretical concepts; 
therefore the earlier discussion of my theoretical tools should also contribute to the validity 
dimension of the thesis. There I (hopefully) made it clear that I am not trying to measure a 
coherent ideology of SD, but I see frames as a way of connecting certain things to a political 
cause. In this case, liberal anti-immigrant frames mean the connections of a defence of liberal 
values to opposition of immigration and multiculturalism.  
 
Reliability – the absence of random errors – is of lesser importance in qualitative research, but I 
would still like to comment briefly. Negligence on the part of the researcher could be a source of 
inadequate reliability. An endeavour to be as meticulous as possible and the fact that I have read 
and re-read my material so as to not miss or overstate something should have minimised the risk 
of unnecessary and random “errors” or implausible interpretations.122 
 
Intersubjectivity, or intersubjective verifiability, is another aspect of research. In its purest form it 
means neutrality of the language of observation: If the same material is processed with the same 
tools the results should be the same, regardless of who did it. This is an ideal which is more 
controversial in qualitative social science research, which is reflexive and interpretative and thus 
dependent on the researcher, in its very nature. Still, this does not mean that different researchers 
should come to totally different conclusions. It is therefore important that the study is 
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122 Bergström & Boréus 2005:35; Esaiasson et al. 2007:70-71 
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transparent and well-founded. This can be reached by an explicit argumentation and an analysis 
reinforced by frequent references to and citations from the material.123 
 
6.1.5. Scheme of analysis  
I analysed my material with the help of a scheme of analysis that I have elaborated with help 
from previous research, so as to reach cumulative affiliation.124 The presentation of my analysis 
following below is roughly structured along these lines. I present my scheme of analysis in a table, 
followed by an explanatory recapitulation of some of the themes I already mentioned in part one. 
 
Table 3. Scheme of analysis 
General frames National identity (traditions) 
 Criminality (social instability) 
 Costs, (welfare chauvinism) 
 Unemployment125 
 Other 
Liberal frames Ethnic or civic nationalism, (boundaries of belonging) 
 Democracy and freedom of speech 
 Individual freedom (freedom of choice) 
 Secularism (Enlightenment) 
 Gender equality, rights of women 
 LGBT (sexual minorities) 
 
The four general frames are based on Rydgren, but are to be found in the work of many 
researchers.126 That this first part is general also means that I opened up for a headline named 
“Other”, so as not to exclude possible frameworks that has not been central in previous research. 
It should be pointed out that “National identity” is not a perfect category. This is because of the 
fact that also the liberal values can be seen as part of the national identity. Therefore I tried to 
focus on national tradition and culture here and kept this short. The liberal frames are mainly 
based on earlier researchers writing about LPF and – to a lesser extent – Fremskrittspartiet and will 
be elaborated on here. 
                                                 
123 Bergström & Boréus 2005:36, cf. Esaiasson et al. 2007:24. Regarding citations: I have chosen not to include the 
Swedish original wordings, out of reasons of readability and space (except for a few cases where I thought it plausible 
to present the original words). The translations have been done by me, in consideration with a couple of different 
dictionaries, and when in doubt, consultation with my native-speaking mentor. For the Swedish reader wanting to 
assess my translations, most of the material is readily available on the Internet, and URLs are included in the 
bibliography. 
124 Söderfeldt 1972:127-129 
125 I later included this under the headline ”Other” since it turned out to be of lesser importance. 
126 Rydgren 2007:244, cf. Eatwell 2003:49 
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The civic nationalism of Lijst Pim Fortuyn was a very different component of the politics of Pim 
Fortuyn in comparison with most anti-immigrant parties. The question of ethnic or civic 
nationalism is maybe more of a philosophical issue than a political issue, and this ideal typical 
distinction is not totally satisfying,127 but civic nationalism and the possibility of inclusion is very 
often tied to the question of LPF not being the typical authoritarian and ethnocratic party, and 
therefore included here.128 Under this headline I discuss ethnopluralism and possibilities of 
inclusion, the boundaries of belonging to the Swedish nation. 
 
Regarding democracy and freedom of speech, Tjitjske Akkerman accentuates how Pim Fortuyn 
was referring over and over again to principles of Western democracy, for example freedom of 
speech, and positing this against immigrants.129 All of these principles are not clearly liberal values 
in the meaning of standing in opposition to authoritarian values on a socio-cultural conflict 
dimension; this is especially true for democracy, which is generally embraced by parties from 
right to left. The usage of a democratic frame is thus beneficial for all political parties, and not 
least for populist parties who have been “successful in marketing themselves as champions of 
‘true’ democracy and defenders of the values and interests of ordinary people.”130 It is still 
interesting to briefly look at this from the perspective of the usage of this framework in relation 
to anti-immigrant politics, because of the frequent references to it in previous research.131 
 
The rights and the autonomy of the individual and freedom of choice are typical liberal values 
and dimensions included in the rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn, who feared that the “Islamization” of 
the Netherlands “would leave little room for freedom of expression [and] individual autonomy.132 
Authoritarian positions normally stress collective identities such as the family and the nation and 
a focus on the individual would thus mean a dangerous fragmentisation of the society as a 
whole.133 Individual freedom contra collectivism in the frames evoked by SD is therefore 
included. 
 
Secularism was an issue defended by Pim Fortuyn. Even though there were some references to a 
Judaeo-Christian heritage in the party’s rhetorics, the LPF mainly “instead of referring to 
                                                 
127 See for example Johansson Heinö 2009:131-139. 
128 Pennings & Keman 2003:62; Akkerman 2005:345-346 
129 Akkerman 2005:passim 
130 Betz & Johnson 2004:312 
131 See also Betz & Meret 2009. 
132 Akkerman 2005:341 
133 Rydgren 2007:242, 245 
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Christian values […] promoted a secular Enlightenment framework.”134 Pim Fortuyn advocated a 
secular society, inspired by the French concept of laïcité.135 He found the separation of the church 
and the state important, and that this neutrality should be strictly enforced in that expressions of 
the freedom of religion should be banned in public. This was connected to immigration, or more 
particular, Islam; the party for example wanted bans on head scarves in schools and for civil 
servants.136 
 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Fremskrittspartiet referred and refer to the importance of women’s rights, 
emancipation and the equality of men and women in society in general, which is not traditionally 
an authoritarian position.137 Many aspects could be related to this, such as family laws, violence 
against women, the right to abortion, and also genital mutilation and enforced marriages.138 
 
One of the more original political issues that Pim Fortuyn thematised during his time as an anti-
immigrant politician was the rights of sexual minorities.139 This was of course not surprising, 
given that Fortuyn himself was homosexual, and given the fact that the Netherlands is one of the 
more liberal countries when it comes to LGBT rights; it was for example the first country to 
accept same-sex marriages in 2001. What was unusual though, was the coupling of this issue with 
anti-immigrant positions. This is a typical liberal issue on a socio-cultural conflict dimension 
which hardly lets it combine with traditional authoritarian values of the right, and thus very 
interesting to look at. 
 
As expressed in the research questions, my main interest is in the usage of liberal values in 
connection with resistance against immigration and multiculturalism, i.e. liberal anti-immigrant 
frames. However, to understand this, I also refer the general standpoints of SD in regards to the 
issues of the scheme of analysis as a background to better understand the meaning of any 
possible liberal framing. 
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6.2. General anti-immigrant frames 
 
6.2.1. National identity 
Sverigedemokraterna is first and foremost a nationalistic party. A typical formulation:  
 
The primary goal of the politics of Sverigedemokraterna is to reinstate a common national 
identity and thus also a strong inner solidarity in Swedish society.140 
 
Following this, immigration is of course very much a question of the erosion of Swedish culture 
and identity. In the immigration policy program, adapted in 2007, it is stated in the beginning that 
“an all too great immigration has come to threaten the Swedish national identity and cohesion in 
the country in a serious way.”141 Integration and multiculturalism are thoroughly negative words, 
and SD promotes assimilation of immigrants, and stresses the centrality of Swedish traditions, 
values, and laws.142 “Let Sweden remain Sweden”, a version of the more fascist associated “Keep 
Sweden Swedish” is also one of the demands of the election manifesto of 2006 and the political 
guidelines of 2010.143 Even though this has changed from a more broad call to a question of 
cultural policy, in both cases there is a connection between Swedish identity and tradition as 
opposed to multiculturalism and immigrants. In the principle program, nationalism is the issue 
that has the biggest coverage. SD also politicises the issue in connection with day-to-day issues 
when possible. One example of this is the defence of traditional school closing days in churches, 
whose cancellations are seen as a sign of a loss to multiculturalism and of Swedish cultural 
heritage, causing party leader Åkesson to state that “the multicultural societal system demands 
that we Swedes renounce our identity and our traditions.144 Another is the example of a man with 
an immigrant background who did not want to shake hands with a female boss, did not get the 
job, and for this was granted a compensation for discrimination. This was framed ny SD as a 
support for violation of the norms and social codes of Swedish society.145 I can not say that I 
have noted a great change to be reported here.146 
 
                                                 
140 Sverigedemokraterna 2007a 
141 Sverigedemokraterna 2007a 
142 Sverigedemokraterna 2007a 
143 Sverigedemokraterna 2006a; 2010e 
144 Sverigedemokraterna 2009d, cf. Sverigedemokraterna 2007b; 2007c; Åkesson 2009 
145 Sverigedemokraterna 2010i 
146 If there is a change, it is connected to the content of the national identity. I mentioned in chapter 6.1.5. that also 
liberal values can be seen as part of the national identity, and an increasing usage of liberal frames as Swedish values 
would thus mean a qualitative change of the national identity. 
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6.2.2. Criminality 
One of the central political issues for SD is criminality, and the framing of immigration 
scepticism in terms of social instability, insecurity and criminality – blaming those issues on 
immigration and a multicultural society – has been a constant tenet of SD. In the election 
manifesto of 2006 and political guidelines of 2010 there is a formulation that immigration and 
integration policies have caused “criminality and increased tension”.147 This is also mentioned in 
the immigration policy program. This frame has been amplified over the years, in that it is more 
directly and explicitly thematised under headlines concerning immigration, but earlier documents 
are not totally devoid of connecting immigrants and criminality, only not as explicit.148 When 
party leader Jimmie Åkesson has been able to write about Muslim immigration he is using a 
similar frame, that is, coupling Muslims with violence and criminality, stating that Muslims have 
another view on the use of violence, that Muslim men are highly overrepresented among rapists, 
and that immigration has led to “social problems, criminality and an increasing hostility against 
Swedishness.”149 This criminality frame is also frequent in the press messages, examples hereof 
are when Åkesson called for plain talk about the cultural dimension of rapes, the demand of a 
tougher stance to fight riots in the immigrant-dense district of Rosengård in Malmö, and the 
campaign against “Swede-hostility”150 launched by the party’s youth organisation SDU after the 
beating of a young girl by an “immigrant gang” in the town of Södertälje.151 With criminality 
frame, I mean the inclination to connect the complex question of criminality to immigration as a 
general phenomenon, reducing it to be solely a cultural problem, or in the words of Snow and 
Benford, “simplifying and condensing the ‘world out there’”.152 
 
6.2.3. Costs 
Frequently used by Sverigedemokraterna is an economic frame, within which SD emphasises costs 
related to immigration. This has to do with the “welfare chauvinism” that many anti-immigrant 
parties are using.153 In the immigration policy program it is stated that immigration has carried 
“great economical costs which inevitably have had a negative impact on Swedish economy and 
have thereby put the general welfare system to the test.”154 In the principle program it is also 
stated that one of the reasons as to why the party was founded was the economical threat to 
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Sweden that immigration policy constituted.155 All election manifestos have also framed 
immigration in economical terms.156 That illegal immigrants get health care for free, while 
Swedish tax-payers have to pay has been an important issue for SD.157 The party has also called 
for investigations of the costs of immigration in the local and regional electorates where it is 
represented.158 The prevailing political issues of personal and state economy are emphasised in 
SD politics. By using an economic frame SD is, as Snow and Benford have described it, bridging 
certain common grievances to its cause. 
 
6.2.4. Other 
Rydgren also mentions that one common view on immigration is that immigrants are taking the 
jobs of the native population. This can be found in the anti-immigrant frames of SD, but is not as 
big an issue as the above-mentioned. SD is opposing labour migration, and sees immigration in 
general as destroying for Swedish workers. Special treatment, in form of affirmative action to 
integrate immigrants on the labour market is also rejected by SD, framed as discrimination and as 
“Swede-hostility”.159  
 
I mentioned how the youth organisation of SD was also using the concept of “Swede-hostility”, a 
kind of “frame transformation”. In this way it defends itself from the common accusations of SD 
being racist by stating that the immigrants are the ones that are racists. Another frame that 
Sverigedemokraterna uses to prove that it is not the racist party that many accuse it of being is its 
present-day ardent position on anti-Semitism, which it is condemning. Since 2008 it repeatedly 
thematises this in its press communication, pointing out that Muslims stand for increasing anti-
Semitism in Sweden. In the words of party leader Åkesson “The evidence that the new anti-
Semitism as well as the growing Swede-hostility is intimately connected to the Muslim 
immigration is overwhelming.”160 
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6.3. Liberal anti-immigrant frames 
 
6.3.1. Ethnic or civic nationalism? 
The long background chapter from earlier party programmes of Sverigedemokraterna – explaining 
the origins of the Swedish people beginning at a time when the ice sheets melted away from 
Scandinavian peninsula161 – has disappeared, but the importance of some kind of homogeneity of 
the Swedish nation are dominating its ideational documents and programs. 
 
One controversial issue regarding the boundaries of Swedishness was the question of adoption, 
and the fact that SD wanted a stop for all adoption of extra-European children, which could be, 
and was often, interpreted as being racist. This was a formulation in the party program from 1999 
that was dropped in the slightly updated program of 2002.162 
 
What was new in the principle program of 2003 compared to earlier party programs was that it 
included a formulation which was later amplified and put in the beginning of the immigration 
policy program, namely “open Swedishness”. It should be possible for immigrants to merge with 
the Swedish nation, even though “[a]ssimilation is a long and difficult process [..] which can take 
many generations to complete.”163 This may be interpreted as something pointing to the fact that 
SD has an idea of the construction of nationality as opposed to seeing it as something almost 
ontologically existent.164 
 
One can observe a slight change in regards to the concepts of ethnicity and ethnopluralism even 
after 2003. A few citations from the principle program composed in 2003: “Let all peoples be 
masters of their own houses.”; “If every person is unique, then every such [autochthonic] 
community is also unique – in particular the nation”, and: 
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the common identity […] presupposes a high degree of ethnical and cultural similarity 
among the population. Out of this follows that the nationalistic principle – the principle of 
one state, one nation – is foundational for the politics of Sverigedemokraterna. 165 
 
In the immigration policy program penned in 2007, which also considers ideas of national 
identity and can thus be interesting to compare, the ideas of the nation or the people as a 
monolithic entity are toned down, references are rather to the more diffuse Swedish identity. The 
idea of “ethnical similarity” is also nowhere to be found. Instead, SD is here condemning “racism 
and doctrines where the ethnical origins counts as the only or essential criteria for belonging to a 
nation.”166 It is important to point out though, that both the principle program and the 
immigration policy program are still working and valid, which means that I can not make too 
firm conclusions here. 
 
When there was an update on the website of SD and the information about the party was cut 
down, the very ethnopluralist formulation “As nationalists we believe that every people has the 
right to autonomy and survival as a people” (nowhere to be found in my other material) 
disappeared.167 Conclusively, Sverigedemokraterna seem to less and less formulate itself in terms 
which could be related to an ethnopluralist world view, and it has made the boundaries of 
belonging to the Swedish nation more porous.  
 
6.3.2. Democracy and freedom of speech 
Sverigedemokraterna has for a long time framed its existence to be a struggle for democracy and 
freedom of speech. “Sverigedemokraterna sees every restraint of political freedom of opinion, 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as a threat to democracy”168 is a formulation from 
the party programs of 1999 and 2002, and similar wordings were also included in the election 
manifesto of 2002.169 Not surprisingly, this has been used when SD has seen limits to its own 
political work, for example when principals have refused to let SD come to their schools or when 
SD meetings have been disturbed by left wing activists.170 
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Democracy and freedom of speech have also in recent years been used as a framework for 
criticising Islam, in relation to well-known occurrences such as the Muhammad caricatures and 
Geert Wilders’ controversial film about Islam, ‘Fitna’.171 The most recent example is when the 
Swedish artist Lars Vilks was attacked at Uppsala University when lecturing about freedom of 
speech and art, showing a film with naked homosexual men in Muhammad masks. Jimmie 
Åkesson then uttered that it is “unacceptable that immigrated extremist groups can silence artists 
and critics” and that: 
 
For us Sweden democrats it is tremendously important to stop the Islamization of Swedish 
society and guard democracy and freedom of speech. In our Sweden Lars Vilks is welcome 
to lecture any time he wants.172 
 
Immigration and Islam is thus framed as threats to democracy and freedom of speech. The value 
defended is the ”right to be critical against religions”, a typical secularist Western modern value. 
Since these values have been embraced for a long time I can not claim that I see any significant 
change here. 
 
6.3.3. Individual freedom 
Sverigedemokraterna views “the interests of the nation as standing over the special interests of 
individuals or groups”.173 Collectives in the forms of family and nation are central to its ideology, 
which is clear in the principle program: 
 
Sure every man is unique, but at the same time we are also more or less similar to one 
another. We are all dependent on communities, people who resemble us in different ways 
and with whom we can identify. Sverigedemokraterna holds that it is first and foremost the 
family and the nation that give us the possibilities to reach this.174 
 
The party has also lamented “excessive hedonism and individualism” as having created insecurity 
and rootlessness.175 Individualism is thus generally seen as something negative, and freedom is 
not very much embraced by the party. A very small, but interesting change can however be noted 
when looking at the political guidelines of 2010. In the newly written part it is stated that there 
are threats “against the freedom and security of Swedish women”, and that these threats are 
misogynist religious and cultures. I will discuss more about gender issues later, but we can note 
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now that the fact that it is the freedom of women that is in danger is a new element in the SD 
frames. In the same chapter there is also a reference to the voluntary life choices of men and 
women, a very novel rhetoric.176 There is one similar rhetorical figure in the rewriting of the 
immigration policy guideline; it starts with the formulation: “In our Sweden freedom and 
openness are given”177 
 
All in all we can conclude that the collectivist nationalistic Sverigedemokraterna traditionally rarely 
uses a liberal discourse about freedom but that there are small signs of this in the most recent 
anti-immigrant frames; in the threat to women from misogynist religions and cultures, and as a 
general introduction to what characterise Sweden in the immigration policy guidelines. 
 
6.3.4. Secularism 
At the turn of the millennium the Church of Sweden was separated from the state, and even 
though there is still some legislation regulating that the church shall be Lutheran and democratic 
the former state church governs itself independently. There are elections to the church assembly 
in Sweden every fourth year, in which Sverigedemokraterna has taken part and has had small but 
increasing success (see table 2) with a very conservative programme, stressing that the church 
should carry Swedish traditions. 
 
Sverigedemokraterna is, as we have seen, ardent defenders of Swedish traditions and among those, 
Christian traditions are found. In the principle program, it is stated that religion, together with 
language, is important to get a complete understanding of the concept of the nation.178 The 
school closing days in churches have already also been mentioned as important, the argument 
here is that Sweden has been a Christian country for more than a thousand years, and that being 
in churches and singing traditional church hymns in the summer closing days is a cultural heritage 
linking today’s pupils with former generations.179 In the immigration policy program from 2007, it 
is stated that there is a risk that religious free schools without connection to Swedish tradition 
create segregation, and that support to religious private schools is only to be given to those 
“resting on a Judeo-Christian foundation”.180 In this way, one can see that immigration scepticism 
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is put in a Christian, and not a liberal, framework in that immigration is causing an erosion of the 
religious traditions and is thus destroying the connection to Swedish cultural heritage. 
 
This view, that (non-Christian) immigration is framed as a danger to Swedish traditions, is 
however to be complemented with an actual change over the years, a move towards a more 
secularist liberal framework. Firstly, when comparing the election manifestos to the church 
assembly elections of SD in 2001, 2005 and 2009, there is one important change. In 2001, this 
was one of the demands of the party: “Sverigedemokraterna wants the Church of Sweden to once 
again become state church.”181 The manifestos of the two following elections are devoid of this 
demand, and instead it is added that Sverigedemokraterna is a ”non-confessional party”.182 That 
is, nowadays it is advocating the more liberal view of a separation of church and state. 
 
For this study this mainly becomes interesting in that the change to becoming non-confessional 
in 2005 allows Sverigedemokraterna to use secularist liberal frames in its criticism of Islam. In 
connection to the Danish Muhammad cartoon controversy SD published a drawing of 
Muhammad on its homepage. Richard Jomshof, a leading SD politician and then chief editor of 
the party newspaper, then said that they did not mean any harm by publishing it and that “if 
Muslims are exasperated by this drawing it shows that the whole thing about the Muhammad 
drawings is just an excuse for Muslims to attack the secular Western world.”183 In a debate article 
about Muslims in Aftonbladet, Jimmie Åkesson compares Christianity and Islam: 
 
[It is assumed that] one will be able to tame Islam in the same way that secular forces since 
centuries have tamed Christianity and bundled it off to the private sphere. Islam is however 
different to Christianity in many essential ways, for example in regard to the distinction 
between spiritual and secular power.184 
 
This argument holds that the difference between Christianity and Islam is mainly their differing 
qualifications in their ability to fit in to the secular society. The former religion is nowadays in the 
private sphere, the latter can not be confined to it, according to Åkesson. He is also here 
embracing the Enlightenment, saying that “Islam and the Muslim world has actively rejected the 
Enlightenment and humanism.”185 He goes on to state that Swedish society has been more 
adapted to Islam than vice versa, and refers to alleged problems with Islam such as gender 
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segregation in swimming halls, fundamentalism and radicalisation among Muslim youth, death 
threats against artist depicting Muhammad, and the overrepresentation of Muslims in committing 
rapes. 
 
SD has changed from wanting the Church of Sweden to be tied to the state, and is now a non-
confessional party. It still stresses the importance of Christian traditions for Swedishness, but it 
can now invoke the liberal secularist principles to criticise Islam, which can not, according to SD, 
unlike Christianity separate worldly and religious authority, which results in a framework which 
positions Islam as a threat to the secular values of Swedish society.186 
 
6.3.5. Gender equality and the rights of women 
In Sweden, known for being leading in questions about women’s rights and political and labour 
market participation,187 Sverigedemokraterna is the most conservative party when it comes to 
questions relating to family policy and women’s emancipation. It regards the traditional nuclear 
family as the foundational unit of society. In the idea document about family policy, adapted in 
2004 and still working, it is stated that men and women shall have the same rights and 
possibilities, but it is also stated that: “Men and women are not created equal though and can 
therefore in different contexts have different points of departure and do things differently”188 and 
that they rather complement each other. The “increased variability in the relations between men 
and women” has created insecurity and alienation for many children, and SD is proposing 
measures to make it easier for mothers to take care of their children at home.189 SD also has a 
more restrictive abortion policy than all of the parties represented in the Swedish parliament. 
 
At the same time as many see SD:s politics as anti-feminist,190 the party has at times explicitly 
condemned repression against women, which then traditionally has been directed against 
immigrants. For example, the family policy document mentioned above, states that enforced 
marriages, “commonly existent in some immigrant groups”, should be fought and punished 
harder; the same formulation also exists in the election manifesto of 2006.191 Locally, SD has 
loudly opposed things like gender segregated swimming education and support to “burkinis”, 
swimming suites covering the entire body, and then framing this as misogynist practices that 
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consolidate the repression of women which exists in other cultures than the Swedish.192 When an 
imam participated in the traditional opening of parliament in 2007, party leader Åkesson called 
this “an insult against Swedish women” and pointed out that this imam was a misogynist who 
was positively inclined to polygamy, enforced marriages and stood for “Muslim cultural 
imperialism”.193 
 
The most obvious change over the years can be noticed when looking at the election manifesto 
of 2006 and the political guidelines of 2010. In the part about family policy there are some 
changes in that the rhetoric about the nuclear family, traditional marriage, and the dangers of the 
“variability in the relations between men and women” are toned down.194 But most interesting is 
that one new political guideline is introduced, namely: “Gender equality and increased security for 
the women of the country”, which is a completely new issue for SD. It can be seen as a “frame 
transformation” of the concept of gender equality, because it is stated that men and women are 
different and that feminist doctrines that are “extreme and turned against reality” dominate the 
debate in contemporary Sweden, and because one of the issues is that the support to gender 
pedagogy should be cut. But it is still of significance that Sverigedemokraterna explicitly lifts the 
“freedom and security” of women, and, above all, that it is using the wording “gender 
equality”,195 which is nowhere to be found in my entire material before these guidelines were 
introduced. The problem representation here is clearly connected to immigration: 
 
In today’s Sweden, misogynist religions and cultures are advancing. In today’s Sweden the 
movement of women is restricted by insecurity. In today’s Sweden more rapes are reported 
than in any other European country. In today’s Sweden human traffickers and pimps can 
exploit women almost without risk.196 
 
Apart from the demand where SD opposes tax money to gender pedagogy, there is one 
relating to trafficking, rape, and violence against women, and one demand which is 
formulated “An increased support to exposed immigrant women through an attack on 
enforced marriages and honour related and religious repression.” 197 
 
This is a clear case of a frame alignment process, where Sverigedemokraterna has changed to now 
invoking a liberal frame (gender equality) for its case against immigration and immigrant cultures. 
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Following Snow et al a little bit further here, this alignment process can be seen as containing two 
dimensions. Firstly, they write about “frame transformation” that: 
 
The process, causes and values that some SMOs [Social Movement Organisations, in my 
case political parties] promote, however, may not resonate with, and on occasion may even 
appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames. When 
such is the case, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or 
understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or “misframings” reframed.198 
 
There is a reframing, or frame transformation, here, in that gender equality is a question about 
freedom and equal treatment, which in SD:s party program means freedom to evolve according 
to the postulated biological differences. Following this idea, the only social influence of gender 
relations that Sverigedemokraterna acknowledges is the one from the state, which in the eyes of SD 
promotes extreme feminism and questioning of gender roles. Consequently, equal treatment for 
SD means no affirmative action.199 Gender equality in Sweden is an issue connecting all 
established parties,200 and to promote something antithetical to this “ritual” of mainstream 
Swedish politics could be causing problem for SD. This is a solution to have the cake and eat it; 
that is, being nominally for gender equality but define it in a way that suites its more traditional 
values. Secondly, this is a case of frame amplification, stressing a value, equality, to use as “a 
springboard for mobilizing support”, in this case against immigrants.201 Conclusively, this stated 
repression of women in immigrant cultures is nothing completely new, but it has never been an 
important issue of its own before, which it is now when it is highlighted as a “gender equality” 
guideline for the coming election. 
 
6.3.6. LGBT 
Sweden is, together with the Netherlands, one of the countries in the world with the most liberal 
LGBT rights.202 The acceptance of homosexuality is the highest in Europe in Netherlands, 
followed by Sweden.203 This is also more or less a consensual issue among the established 
Swedish political parties – for example only KD, the Christian democrats stand out, for example 
by being the only party opposed to same sex marriages.  
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Sverigedemokraterna also has conservative standpoints regarding these issues, but there have been 
some changes over the years. The centrality of the traditional nuclear family with a man and a 
woman is stated over and over again in the party’s material. In the idea document about family 
policy it is stated that “Sverigedemokraterna believes that marriage shall be reserved for couples 
consisting of a man and a woman.”204 In the same document it is said that the party opposes the 
right of lesbians to be artificially inseminated, because of the children’s right to a father and a 
mother. The opposition to the right to artificial insemination of lesbians and same-sex couples is 
also included in the election manifesto from 2006, but dropped from the guidelines for the 
election of 2010, which has nothing explicitly stated at all concerning LGBT issues.205 This 
silence, and the silence of the working principle program is all the more interesting when 
comparing to how homosexuality was thematised earlier. In the former party program there was a 
headline entitled “sexual deviance”,206 under which it was stated that: “The glorification of the 
homosexual lifestyle in e.g. mass media creates unsound reference frames for young people”.207 
Here, same-sex marriage was not an issue, but SD even opposed registered partnership of 
homosexual couples. 
 
At the end of March 2010, at about the same time as the LGBT-silent political guidelines were 
adopted, something even more interesting occurred. In Aftonbladet, Jimmie Åkesson and second 
vice-chair Carina Herrstedt published a debate article which was entitled “SD – a party for LGBT 
persons”,208 which was a reply to a debate article that accused SD of having the worst politics for 
families and sexual minorities in Sweden.209 In the article, Åkesson and Herrstedt admitted and 
regretted that “individual representatives for our party, on single occasions” had uttered improper 
statements about homosexuals as a group,210 but underlined that such derogatory attitudes had no 
foundation in the party’s political programs. They also claimed that support for SD might even 
be greater among LGBT persons, despite the “stereotypes” about the party.211 The answer as to 
why support of SD had increased in this group, according to Åkesson and Herrstedt, was the 
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“strong anxiety” about mass immigration and the hate against homosexuals which goes hand in 
hand with the increasing “Islamization” of Swedish society.  
 
When Sweden’s largest Muslim youth association invites the extreme imam Sheik Abdullah 
Hakim Quick, who thinks that homosexuals should be executed, as a speaker then we 
understand that homosexuals look around for a defender of Western, democratic values. 
There Sverigedemokraterna plays a unique and very important role in society.212 
 
This is a very clear example of how SD uses a debate and turns it into an issue about 
immigration, and a very clear example of a liberal anti-immigrant frame. The problem for 
homosexuals is not Sverigedemokraterna, who has a foundational “respect for sexual minorities” – 
the problem is immigrants in general and Muslims in particular, who, according to Åkesson and 
Herrstedt, are against the rights of LGBT persons. 
 
Not as central, and not as noted as the former article, but interesting and roughly along the same 
lines was an article by Erik Almqvist, leader of the youth organisation and a notable SD 
politician, published on the internet debate site Sourze.213 In this article, Almqvist accuses RFSU 
(the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education) for stigmatising LGBT persons by always 
standing for an extreme and spectacular form of homosexuality; in this way he presents RFSU as 
the very source of the “Othering” of homosexuals in society. SD, Almqvist argues, sees 
homosexuals as normal persons who should be treated as everybody else. RFSU is one threat to 
SD:s view of LGBT persons as normal individuals, but a bigger threat is presented towards the 
end of the article: “the Muslim groups […] with an even more distasteful agenda: to repress and 
punish those with another sexual orientation than heterosexual.”214 The rights of homosexuals to 
be normal and treated as everybody else is thus taken as a reason for pointing out the threat from 
Muslims, another example of how hostility against immigrant groups is framed in liberal terms. 
 
Liberal anti-immigrant frames means positioning the immigrant out-group as not fitting in with 
liberal Western democracy, and the evolution of SD in regards to LGBT issues can be seen as an 
example of this. Conclusively, the open opposition to “sexual deviance” on the part of SD 
disappears gradually between 2002 and 2010, and even though it definitely can be questioned 
whether Sverigedemokraterna actually is pursuing LGBT friendly politics, in 2010 it presents itself as 
a party for LGBT persons. By doing this, it tries to put itself inside the mainstream of Swedish 
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political culture, and thus has the possibility of framing immigrants in general and Muslims in 
particular as being the real threat to LGBT persons.  
 
6.4. Conclusions of part two 
When Anders Widfeldt wrote about Sverigedemokraterna in 2008, he named his article “Party 
change as a necessity”.215 He then mainly focused on how SD had moved away from its more 
extremist racist roots by embracing democracy and dropping references which could be seen as 
biological racism. After my study, I argue that change is an on-going process, which does not end 
with the split from the anti-democratic fascist past. Change is internationally influenced by 
diffusion processes, with adoption and translation of successful frames. 
 
To summarise what we have seen in the analysis: First, Sverigedemokraterna is frequently using 
economic and criminality anti-immigrant frames, connecting immigrants to increased criminality 
and costs for the welfare state. It is also using national tradition frames and to a lesser extent 
blame unemployment on immigrants. There are small tendencies that the criminality frame is 
amplified, but otherwise, these “general frames” have been fairly constant. Second, concerning 
the liberal frames, we can see that SD, since 2001, has come out as a secularist non-confessional 
party, it continues to use appeals of democracy and freedom of speech, it is to a lesser extent 
using references to the ethnical homogeneity of the people and now includes the idea of “open 
Swedishness”. Most recently, it has embraced gender equality as a political guideline and then 
uses the appeal to the “freedom” of women, and it has publicly stated that it is a party for LGBT 
persons. To this we can also add that SD now repeatedly condemns anti-Semitism publicly. 
 
Secularism and Enlightenment ideals, freedom in general and freedom of speech in particular, 
gender equality, and the possibility for homosexuals to live as normal individuals – all of these 
issues have been conceptualised as being under threat from immigrants in general and Muslims in 
particular. Anti-Semitism is also seen mainly as an immigrant problem. These are what I call 
liberal anti-immigrant frames, which means that the values of Western liberal democracy, and not 
first and foremost the ethnic homogeneity of the people, need to be defended by nationalists. 
 
I am in no way trying to say that Sverigedemokraterna has turned upside down and have become a 
thoroughly liberal party. It is still a nationalistic and value conservative party when comparing its 
positions to other Swedish parties, and it still uses the common criminality, welfare chauvinist 
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and national tradition frames in its critique of immigrants. The defence of liberal values by SD is 
also almost exclusively related to immigrants, as a reason to restrict immigration and force 
assimilation. But the interesting thing here is that the frames that the party uses to motivate its 
politics have changed. 
 
If we are to understand this with help from the concepts of framework, diffusion and translation, 
we can note a few things. The successful liberal frames of Pim Fortuyn can be seen as having 
been diffused to the Swedish context where some ideas have been adopted by SD. There are 
responsive chords in the Swedish society.216 Firstly, there is empirical credibility in that as in most 
Western European countries, there has been a considerable immigration both from neighbouring 
and non-European countries during the last decades,217 which has caused debate about 
integration and multiculturalism, not least in relation to the Muslim population. Secondly, there is 
also a narrative fidelity, given the cultural linkages of the societies; they are among the most liberal 
and progressive countries in Western Europe, and pride in civic virtues are more important than 
ethnically or historically framed national pride.218 One translation that can be noted is of the 
framing of immigrants as a threat to women and sexual minorities, which is translated not to 
adapt to the country but the party context. In SD the question is not so much of emancipation of 
women and sexual minorities. While a stress on for example gender equality frame may fit in with 
the Swedish cultural context, for a value conservative party like SD to thematise it, it had to be 
transformed. SD, which has an extreme right background and is value conservative, still stands 
for the centrality of the family consisting of a man and a woman, opposing same-sex marriage, 
and issues such as affirmative action and gender pedagogy.219 Highlighting these issues on the 
part of SD has not been a case of advocating emancipation, rather as framing immigrants 
(Muslims in particular) as a worse, or the “real” threat. 
 
We can conclude that it seems as if Sverigedemokraterna oscillates between a defence of liberal 
values which seems to be growing as a successful frame internationally and provide narrative 
fidelity in the Swedish context on the one hand and its national conservative identity on the 
other. As it is still a rather small party, it will be interesting to follow its evolution further. 
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7. INTEGRATED CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Integrated conclusions of the thesis 
I have used a genetic idea analysis in my study of Sverigedemokraterna, which has shown the 
relationship between the anti-immigrant frames of SD and ideas put forward by the Dutch Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn,220 a flash party defending liberal values and therefore often seen as a kind of outsider 
in the anti-immigrant party group that is often regarded as radical right and authoritarian. It 
should be pointed out that the main interest has not been to ascribe the ideas solely to, or being 
born in, LPF, or showing that SD themselves have mainly been directly influenced by LPF. The 
diffusion of a framework which sees immigrants as a threat to liberal values from the 
Netherlands to Sweden has, however, taken place as issues promoted by Pim Fortuyn have been 
increasingly adopted by the national conservative SD. 
 
To return to the question of the anti-immigrant party group, I think that my empirical study in 
part two has contributed to my claim that it is reasonable to group parties who articulate 
opposition against immigration and multiculturalism as a central message and content of their 
politics. Even though it can be doubted whether parties like LPF or Fremskrittspartiet would 
belong to a group of parties labelled “extreme” or “radical” right, it makes sense to conceive of a 
group where both these and parties like Front National and Sverigedemokraterna are included. This is 
because, as I earlier pointed out, that an opposition to immigration and the question of some 
kind of national cohesion excluding perceived out-group cultures are central to their message. It 
is also because of the fact that voters seem to have turned to LPF for mainly the same reasons as 
they turned to anti-immigrant parties in other countries.221 Finally, as my empirical study has 
confirmed, the anti-immigrant frames used by Pim Fortuyn can diffuse, or be translated to parties 
with a more authoritarian ideology, which shows a connection between these parties. Even 
though there are more ideological features to anti-immigrant parties than opposition to 
immigration and multiculturalism, these are central, and it seems like as if the successful anti-
immigrant frames that are available are too desirable to resist, they only have to be translated and 
transformed to fit the national and/or party context. 
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It should again be pointed out that the defence of liberal values as we saw it in the SD version 
was almost exclusively related to immigrants. This means that it should not be perceived as 
profound ideological change, but as Hagelund pointed out concerning Fremskrittspartiet, rather a 
pragmatic approach of sampling issues which seem relevant and using them as reasons for the 
party’s general point of view,222 or as I put it earlier, finding frames that work. This could also be 
seen as an ongoing struggle for, as Hagelund put it, becoming “decent” in the eyes of the public; 
parties need to position themselves just inside the borders of the mainstream and use frames 
which are not immediately conceived of as anti-liberal.  
 
Another point that I made in part one which was reconfirmed in the study of Sverigedemokraterna  
in part two was the centrality of Islam in connection with the liberal anti-immigrant frames. 
Critique against Islam has had a successful diffusion as a potent framework for anti-immigrant 
parties for different reasons. Firstly, it is easy to connect with larger global narratives connected 
to the war against terrorism. Secondly, as we have seen in the case of SD, authoritarian and 
traditional values as well as liberal and modern values can be used in relation to Islam. Islam can 
thus be presented as an important source of criminality, putting forward calls for stricter 
enforcement of law and order and as a threat to national traditions in different forms, but also as 
inherently and necessarily oppressing women and homosexuals, and being backward, refusing to 
accept Enlightenment and secular values. Thirdly, because of this it is flexible and can be 
translated into different contexts, meaning that liberal and/or authoritarian values can be 
amplified. We have also seen how both Sverigedemokraterna, who are now very Israel friendly and 
condemns anti-Semitism, and the British National Party, with a party leader who has denied the 
holocaust, 223 have increasingly been directing their political cause against Muslims. Fourthly, 
because critique against Islam is legitimate in a way that racism or ethnopluralism is not. This also 
has different dimensions. One is that if critique is directed against Islam as a religion or ideology, 
it could be argued that it is not at all racist (because it is not a question of ethnicity or race) or for 
that sake directed against individuals (it is common to say that one has nothing against individual 
Muslims, but Islam as an ideology). Another is that surveys have shown that most Europeans are 
inclined to be sceptical of Islam.224 It is also legitimate because of the fact that in many countries, 
even mainstream parties are publicly critical to Islam in some way. The proposed ban on burqas 
and niqabs in Belgium and France, for example, is widely supported, and not an issue confined to 
the anti-immigrant parties. 
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7.2. Discussion and suggestions for future research 
What I have done in the empirical part of this study is to analyse the frames used by 
Sverigedemokraterna in connection to immigrants. It must be said that this has been made at a fairly 
early stage. SD is, if not an embryonic or peripheral party, still a party outside the mainstream of 
Swedish politics, some of the changes I noted in my analysis only occurred during the time I 
conducted my study, and it remains to be seen if this process of change towards a more liberally 
framed immigrant critique will be accelerated or halted.  
 
In a first step, research needs to be conducted after the parliamentary election in Sweden in 2010. 
Then it will be possible to see if Sverigedemokraterna was successful and if so, to analyse the reasons 
behind its success. How SD has framed its immigrant critique will be one of many dimensions in 
assessing its possible success in the election, and the frames must then be studied together with 
voter preferences and the possibility for SD to be seen and heard in the media. We do not know 
yet how much stress that will be laid on liberal anti-immigrant frames in its campaign, or how this 
will be received by the Swedish voters.  
 
In a longer perspective, the evolution of Sverigedemokraterna will also be interesting to follow. The 
(admittedly) minor turn towards a liberal framework is not without contradictions. For example, 
it will be hard for SD to continue to claim that it is a party for LGBT persons, while at the same 
time being the least permissive party in actual propositions concerning LGBT issues and having a 
party secretary who has publicly spoken out against the pride festival.225 It is also interesting to 
note how the changes affect the party organisation and matriculation register; already many 
former members have been excluded from the party,226 and SD will have to balance its identity as 
the only real value conservative party in Sweden with a too sharp turn in the direction of liberal 
values. 
 
In this thesis I have empirically focused on only one country and one party and have shown that 
cross-national diffusion may take place between anti-immigrant parties with different ideological 
backgrounds. My aim has not been to generalise, but it could be suggested that this diffusion may 
take place on other routes than the one between the Netherlands and Sweden. It would therefore 
be very interesting to see to what extent similar changes have taken place in other parties which 
have the same ideological background as Sverigedemokraterna, but have another cultural context, 
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and what translations have then needed to be executed. This goes firstly for Western Europe, but 
also for countries in Eastern Europe, which for example do not have notable Muslim immigrant 
groups but xenophobic and right-wing parties. Here is a field of future empirical research, which 
would gain from being conducted in an international comparative way. 
 
I have discussed how anti-immigrant parties have used liberal frames to oppose immigration and 
multiculturalism, and we have seen in the case of SD that liberal values are almost exclusively 
related to the immigration issue. But this is not in any way restricted to this party family. 
Johansson Heinö has written about “conditioned tolerance” as a liberal critique of non-liberal 
phenomenon associated with multicultural societies and as demands for adaptation to certain 
aspects of the liberal Western democracy. He sees Lijst Pim Fortuyn as an example of this, but also 
liberal parties which could not be considered as anti-immigrant, like Venstre in Denmark, VVD in 
the Netherlands and the Swedish Folkpartiet. The difference between the anti-immigrant parties 
and the liberal parties promoting “conditioned tolerance” is that the latter do not combine this 
with an idea of national homogeneity to the same extent, and that they can often demand 
adaptation and concurrently push for increased immigration, instead of using liberal frames as a 
reason for exclusion and closing borders.227 This could be taken as a proof of the fact that 
demands for adaptation to liberal Western values are not necessarily used as exclusionary and 
anti-immigrant. On the other hand the question can be raised to what extent for example a ban 
on headscarves is a liberal emancipative arrangement, which it is often said to be; a question that 
of course is to be assessed out of certain definitions of liberalism, and in different national 
context regarding the relations between religious life and political life.228 There are interesting 
normative discussions regarding liberal democracy along the lines of universalism versus 
multiculturalism and how the notion of “equality” should be implemented in society. Such 
discussions have of course been held for a long time,229 but they will not diminish in significance 
if anti-immigrant parties which have long been regarded as anti-liberal will increasingly frame 
their immigrant critique as a defence of liberal values. One question is if liberal parties move 
more in the direction of the anti-immigrant parties and seek to cooperate or search for ways of 
clearly showing the boundaries between them.  
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SUMMARY 
In this thesis I conduct a two part study, which has the aim of contributing to the understanding 
of the anti-immigrant party group in Western Europe, the evolution and diffusion of the political 
message within it, and to the anti-immigrant “frames” of Sverigedemokraterna. 
 
In part one, I present my views on how to define the anti-immigrant party family. I argue that it 
is reasonable to group parties that share resentment towards immigration and multiculturalism as 
the most central part of their politics even though they have different origins and partially 
different ideologies. Some researchers have hesitated to include Lijst Pim Fortuyn or 
Fremskrittspartiet in the family, because they do not fit in with the assertions that anti-immigrant 
parties are ethnonationalists and radically right-wing in an authoritarian anti-liberal way, 
occupying one end of a socio-cultural conflict dimension where the other is liberal and 
progressive. I argue that the usage of this authoritarian-libertarian model to explain party family 
cohesion is not optimal, since an anti-immigrant party does not have to embrace all of the values 
connected to one end of the conflict dimension. Instead, anti-immigrant politics is a question of 
using frames that work in a specific country context. 
 
In part two, I ask which anti-immigrant frames are used by Sverigedemokraterna and to what extent 
it could be possible to map a diffusion of liberal frames from LPF to SD. I answer these 
questions with the help of a text analysis of material where SD publicly presents its message. I 
find that costs, criminality and national identity were common and fairly constant general frames 
used by SD to motivate opposition against immigration and multiculturalism. Regarding liberal 
anti-immigrant frames, I find that since 2001 SD has come out as secularists, is to a lesser extent 
using references to the ethnical homogeneity of the people, instead including the concept “open 
Swedishness”. It has adopted gender equality as a political guideline and stated that it is a party 
for LGBT persons. It is also repeatedly condemning anti-Semitism. Secularism, freedom in 
general, and freedom of speech in particular, together with gender equality, and the possibility for 
homosexuals and Jews to live normal lives – all of these issues have been conceptualised by SD 
as being under threat from immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Its defence of these 
liberal values is almost exclusively connected to immigrants. Even though SD is a national 
conservative party with roots in neo-fascism, it has adopted and translated frames used by the 
more liberal LPF in the Netherlands. This could be understood to stem from the fact that both 
countries are liberal. This diffusion, I argue, is also a confirmation of the fact that parties with 
different backgrounds should be included in the same party family.  
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SAMMANFATTNING 
Jag genomför i den här uppsatsen en tvådelad studie, med syftet att bidra till förståelsen av en 
invandrarkritisk partifamilj i Västeuropa, utvecklingen och spridningen av politiska budskap inom 
denna samt de invandringskritiska tolkningsramar som används av Sverigedemokraterna. 
 
I del ett presenterar jag min syn på hur man kan definiera den invandrarkritiska partifamiljen. Jag 
menar att det är rimligt att gruppera partier som delar motstånd mot invandring och mångkultur 
som en central del av sin politik, även om dessa har olika ursprung och delvis olika ideologier. 
Vissa forskare tvekar att inkludera Lijst Pim Fortuyn och Fremskrittspartiet i den här partifamiljen, på 
grund av att de inte passar in i antaganden om att invandrarkritiska partier är etnonationalister 
och radikalhöger i betydelsen auktoritära och anti-liberala, vilket betyder att de skulle befinna sig i 
ena ändan på en tänkt sociokulturell konfliktlinje där den andra ändan är liberal och progressiv. 
Jag menar att användandet av den här auktoritär-liberal-konfliktlinjen inte är optimal för att 
definiera partifamiljen eftersom ett invandrarkritiskt parti inte måste omfatta alla värderingar i en 
ända av den. I stället handlar invandrarkritisk politik om att hitta tolkningsramar som passar i 
specifika nationella kontexter. 
 
I del två undersöker jag vilka invandrarkritiska tolkningsramar som används av Sverigedemokraterna, 
och i vilken grad man kan se en spridning av liberala tolkningsramar från LPF till SD. Jag 
besvarar mina frågeställningar med hjälp av textanalys av officiellt material från SD. Jag kommer 
fram till att kostnader, kriminalitet och nationell identitet var vanliga och relativt konstanta 
tolkningsramar för att motivera motstånd mot invandring och mångkultur. Gällande mer liberala 
invandrarkritiska tolkningsramar, framkommer att SD sedan 2001 har blivit sekularister, att de 
mindre betonar etnisk homogenitet och i stället inkluderar konceptet ”öppen svenskhet”. De har 
antagit jämställdhet som en politisk riktlinje och hävdat att de är ett parti för HBT-personer. De 
fördömer också anti-semitism. Sekulära principer, frihet i allmänhet och yttrandefrihet i 
synnerhet, jämställdhet och möjligheten för homosexuella och judar att leva normala liv – alla 
dessa frågor har framställts som varande under hot från invandrare generellt och muslimer 
specifikt. Partiets försvar för dessa liberala värderingar är nästan uteslutande sammanbundet med 
invandrare. Även om SD är ett nationalkonservativt parti med rötter i nyfascism, så har det 
antagit och översatt tolkningsramar som använts av mer liberala LPF i Holland. Detta kan förstås 
som delvis beroende på att det är två värderingsmässigt liberala länder. Den här spridningen, 
menar jag, är även en bekräftelse på att det är rimligt att gruppera partier med olika bakgrund i en 
och samma partifamilj. 
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